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This dissertation explores society’s relationship with energy systems. Focusing on two areas of 
energy economics—electricity reliability and clean energy technology adoption—my objective is to 
provide insights on energy markets that can contribute towards informing energy policy and improving 
quality of life. 
In the first chapter, I examine how firm-level corruption on the demand side of the electricity 
sector impacts electricity reliability in developing countries. Showing that bribes for electricity 
connections are closely related to power outages experienced by firms, this chapter demonstrates how 
consumer-level corrupt behavior negatively impacts electricity service provision. In the second chapter, I 
study homeowners’ stated information searching about solar photovoltaic (PV) adoption in California’s 
residential market. Exploring differences between the types of information sought by consumers adopting 
solar through third-party ownership (TPO) relative to consumers who purchase solar systems outright 
(host-ownership (HO)), this chapter sheds light on differences between business model consumer 
preferences in the residential solar PV market. Lastly, in the third chapter I estimate solar subsidy pass-
through to the prices faced by consumers in California’s residential solar PV market and ask whether 
incidence differs for TPO consumers where subsidies are directed to the third party owner of the system 
(or the “seller”) and HO consumers where subsidies go directly to the consumer (or the “buyer”). I find 
that TPO consumers capture more than 100 percent of every dollar of solar subsidy while HO consumers 
capture less than 100 percent of every dollar. This is surprising because standard economic theory 
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This dissertation empirically explores diverse but related questions about human society’s 
relationship with energy systems. Focusing on two overlapping areas of energy economics—electricity 
reliability and clean energy technology adoption—my objective is to provide insights on energy markets 
that can contribute to informing energy policy and improving quality of life. 
 Chapter two focuses on electricity reliability in developing countries. More than 1.2 billion 
people around the world are without electricity (UN 2015). However, modern energy access requires 
more than just a physical connection—it requires a reliable and secure connection, and one billion 
additional people globally have access to only unreliable power networks. Unreliable and inadequate 
power can hinder or completely halt enterprise and household productivity, creating significant 
constraints on economic activity, growth, and human development. At the same time, improving 
reliability is characterized by vast complexity and is not strictly an issue related to investing in physical 
electrical infrastructure expansions and improvements. The problems are often symptoms of much deeper 
issues that transcend the boundaries of the electricity sector and are intimately tied to areas such as 
governance, corruption, fiscal policy, social equity, and political institutions. 
 As such, the underlying causes of poor electricity reliability are complex and critically relevant to 
policymakers and ultimately every member of society. In chapter two I study corruption at the consumer 
level and show how bribes for electricity connections affect electricity reliability. Using detailed firm-
level data I estimate instrumental variable specifications with repeated cross-sections and means-based 
pseudo-panels and find that bribes are closely related to higher incidence of power outages and higher 
commercial losses due to power outages. Although bribes made by consumers may be rational as firms 
seek to secure electricity connections in order to operate, I postulate that if we believe bribery for 
electricity connections is a reasonable proxy for over-consumption of electricity, then bribes, or 
“unmanaged demand”, facilitate a weaker state of the electrical system that is more vulnerable to failure. 
This is contrary to the intuitive result of bribe transactions leading to more reliable service provision. 
 To my knowledge, this paper is the first to demonstrate how consumer-level corrupt behavior on 
the demand side of the electricity sector negatively impacts service provision. I argue that the findings can 
be explained in the context of the well-known common-pool resource (CPR) problem, where rationality at 
the individual level leads to an outcome that is not optimal from the perspective of the group. This 
phenomenon parallels a tragedy of the commons story. Users fail to internalize the congestion costs that 
they impose on others, leading to inefficient consumption and diminished resource quality.  
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Ensuring adequate electricity reliability is increasingly complex, particularly in a developing 
country context. It is the aim of chapter two to highlight the relevance of just one underlying issue related 
to the ways in which humans realistically interact with the physical system and shed light on the potential 
of policies and governance interventions that focus on reducing corruption at the consumer level in the 
quest for improving electricity reliability. This research also provides insights into the governance of 
large socio-technical systems that exhibit CPR characteristics where there is a tension between behavior 
at the individual level and social efficiency, such as electricity grids. 
Relatedly, electricity systems and their reliability are also vulnerable to increasing climate change 
risks. Weather events caused by climate change such as more frequent and extreme heat waves and cold 
temperatures, rising sea levels, heavy precipitation, droughts, and more all affect how much energy is 
produced, delivered, and consumed. While some of these changes have been linked to human influences, 
humans also have the capacity to curb further climate change and alleviate its impact on society. 
Effective policy, decision-making, and innovation in the power sector can play a critical role 
towards this objective. Electricity and heat production account for 25 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs), which are most likely the dominant cause of global warming since the mid-20
th
 
Century (IPCC 2014). Increasing emission of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases into the 
atmosphere will lead to growing climate change risks such as extreme weather events, and alleviating the 
impacts of climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions in GHGs (IPCC 2014). 
Society’s energy choices are part of the solution towards finding the efficient balance for meeting 
modern energy demands while also protecting the environment and public health by reducing global 
GHGs. As such, one of the today’s most pressing policy issues is the availability and use of reliable, 
affordable, and clean energy. The remainder of this dissertation, chapters three and four, explore one 
related area of research: clean energy technologies. I focus on the market for residential solar photovoltaic 
(PV) systems in the United States, which has grown exponentially over the past decade and plays an 
increasingly important role in the energy policy dialogue. Furthermore, focusing on the United States 
provides insights into one promising market for reducing global GHGs as it is the world’s largest 
economy and second largest electricity producer and consumer today. 
In chapter three I explore consumer decision-making in California’s residential solar PV market. I 
focus on differences in host-ownership (HO) and third-party ownership (TPO) consumer preferences. As 
the dominant form of solar contracts in California today, the TPO model offers consumers the option to 
pay a third party owner for using a solar system by either signing a lease or a power purchase agreement 
(PPA) with little or no money down. This allows consumers to overcome some of the key solar PV 
adoption barriers by reducing or eliminating upfront costs, technology risk, and the installation process 
complexity (Margolis and Zuboy, 2006). On the other hand, HO requires homeowners to purchase solar 
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panels directly, incur technology risk, and bear installation process complexity—though they also enjoy 
larger financial benefits over system lifetime and own the system. 
Combining a unique and proprietary household-level survey dataset including 1,234 solar PV 
adopters and 790 non-adopters from San Diego County, California, covering the years 2007 to 2013, with 
another proprietary dataset of TPO contract prices and terms from 2010 to 2014, I take a reduced form 
approach to recover information about preferences based upon the stated amount of time spent seeking 
information on specific aspects of solar adoption. The results indicate that TPO customers spend more 
time researching required home modifications associated with installing solar while HO customers spend 
more time researching expected financial returns. I interpret this as a reflection of differences in consumer 
preferences across the two groups: TPO customers may place a higher value on reducing hassle related to 
technology adoption since someone else owns the product that will be installed on their property while 
HO customers may be more concerned with long-term investment returns. 
Understanding consumer preferences is critical for informing marketing strategies. Innovative 
business models such as TPO of technologies or products can open up markets to new customer bases and 
remove barriers to entry, and understanding how consumer preferences differ between the two markets 
can provide valuable guidance for reducing customer acquisition costs and accelerating the diffusion of 
solar PV. As firms develop more accurate profiles of their potential customers for each business model 
type, they can reduce the amount of time and resources wasted on unlikely customers by targeting 
marketing tactics and information provision accordingly. This can also reduce customer acquisition costs 
as it reduces the amount of time between a customer’s initial interest in solar and actual solar adoption. 
While the solar market has experienced tremendous cost improvements over the past decade, customer 
acquisition costs remain substantial. Reducing such costs through strategic marketing can accelerate 
technology diffusion while also improving firm competitiveness. 
In chapter four I study solar subsidy incidence in California’s residential solar PV market. At 
least some of the growth in the solar PV market can be attributed to widely adopted government 
incentives. Although there is agreement that the best policy for reducing negative externalities from 
energy use is to implement a tax or cap-and-trade program, many governments subsidize cleaner 
alternatives to traditional fossil fuel-based technologies instead of pricing negative externalities associated 
with energy use. However, whether solar subsidies actually benefit solar customers is an open question. 
Currently there are no studies that estimate how solar subsidy pass-through differs based on the use of 
TPO as opposed to HO, yet the TPO model has become the dominant form of residential solar contracts.  
This chapter seeks to answer two related questions. First, what proportion of solar subsidies is 
passed-through to the system prices that consumers face? Second, do pass-through rates differ between 
HO and TPO markets? Standard economic theory predicts that the relative benefit of a subsidy is 
	 4 
independent of who actually receives the subsidy. In other words, incidence does not depend upon 
whether a subsidy is directed to buyers (in the case of HO) or to sellers (in the case of TPO). Although 
third parties own the system in the case of TPO, I interpret third parties to be sellers because they lease 
systems to consumers. Incidence might differ across these two business models for a variety of reasons, 
including consumer selection and differences in the competitiveness of HO versus TPO markets. 
To answer these questions, I estimate the effect of solar subsidies on post-incentive solar PV 
system prices allowing for heterogeneous effects between HO and TPO consumers. I use a unique setting 
and rich data from California and study the largest state rebate program in the United States so far—the 
California Solar Initiative (CSI). The results show that subsidy pass-through is much higher for TPOs 
than it is for HOs. While HO consumers capture less than 100 percent of every dollar, TPO consumers 
capture more than 100 percent of every dollar. This is surprising because the familiar result of invariance 
would predict that subsidy incidence is independent of to whom the subsidy is directed. To my 
knowledge, this paper is the first to study how solar subsidy pass-through differs for TPO and HO 
consumers, as past studies of solar subsidy incidence have been unable to estimate pass-through for TPO 
consumers because of data limitations. Furthermore, other studies of green technology subsidy incidence 
do not differentiate pass-through for third party market consumers to my knowledge.  
Chapter four is also relevant for today’s policymakers since estimating pass-through for solar 
subsidies demonstrates how benefits accrue in different parts of the solar market. This is important in the 
context of understanding the redistribution of revenue. Furthermore, the findings suggest that a higher 
proportion of solar subsidies are transferred to TPO consumers relative to HO consumers, counter to the 
common public perception that third party companies are using deceptive tactics to scam customers on 
the use of incentives. Future work will explore what explains the remarkably high pass-through to TPO 
consumers and why pass-through differs based upon to whom the subsidy is directed.  
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BRIBES, BUREAUCRACIES AND BLACKOUTS: TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING HOW 
CORRUPTION AT THE FIRM LEVEL IMPACTS ELECTRICITY RELIABILITY 
 









This paper looks at whether bribes for electricity connections affect electricity reliability. Using 
detailed firm-level data, we estimate various specifications based upon repeated cross-sections and 
means-based pseudo-panels to show that bribes are closely related to poorer electricity reliability. We find 
that the propensity to bribe for an electricity connection is associated with an increase of 20 power 
outages per month and a 28 percent increase in annual sales lost due to power outages on average. The 
results parallel a tragedy of the commons story: electricity, which exhibits common-pool resource 
characteristics, suffers from overexploitation as self-interested individual firms rationally bribe for 
electricity, creating negative impacts in aggregate on the overall quality of the resource. Given the 
importance of electricity reliability for economic growth and development, the findings imply that 
improving oversight and enforcement measures at the consumer level targeting the reduction of bribery 
for electricity connections could contribute to growth and development. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
More than 1.2 billion people around the world are without electricity and one billion more have 
access to only unreliable power networks (UN, 2015). Unreliable and inadequate power can hinder or 
completely halt enterprise productivity, creating significant constraints on economic activity, growth, and 
human development. A handful of papers empirically illustrate these effects. For example, Andersen and 
Dalgaard (2013) demonstrate how weak power infrastructure leads to a substantial growth drag, Fisher-
Vanden et al. (2015) show that electricity shortages significantly limit firm productivity, Rud (2012) 
studies electricity provision and industrial development and finds a strong relationship between 
electrification and manufacturing output, and Dollar et al. (2005) show that power losses have a 
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statistically significant negative effect on productivity.
3
 Poor electricity reliability also impedes the ability 
of households to conduct everyday activities, ranging from revenue generating and capacity building 
activities to social engagements. Humans rely critically on a secure and stable, high-quality supply of 
power, however improving reliability is characterized by vast complexity and is not strictly an issue 
related to investing in physical electrical infrastructure expansions and improvements. The problems are 
often symptoms of much deeper issues that transcend the boundaries of the electricity sector and are 
intimately tied to areas such as governance, corruption, fiscal policy, social equity, and political 
institutions.  
As such, the underlying causes of poor electricity reliability are complex and critically relevant to 
policymakers, revenue-generating firms, and ultimately every member of society. In this paper, we focus 
on corruption at the consumer level and show how bribery for electricity connections is related to poorer 
electricity reliability as measured by power outages and their related commercial losses. Bribes made by 
consumers reflect rational self-interested behavior as firms seek to secure electricity connections in order 
to operate. However, in aggregate, we postulate that this bribing behavior overexploits the electrical grid, 
creating a weaker system that is more vulnerable to power outages. In light of this, these firms actually 
experience more power outages and incur greater commercial losses, which is contrary to the intuitive 
result of the bribe transaction resulting in more secure and reliable service provision.  
 Using detailed firm-level bribery and electricity reliability data, we form a dataset of repeated cross-
sections including 72,617 manufacturing and services firms across 118 countries from 2006 to 2012. We 
also create a means-based pseudo-panel for an additional set of specifications. Instrumenting for the 
endogeneity of bribery with five firm-level instruments, our results across numerous robustness checks 
consistently show that bribes for electricity connections have a statistically significant correlation with 
more monthly power outages and their related commercial losses. In the preferred specifications, we find 
that the propensity to bribe for an electricity connection is associated with an increase of 20 power 
outages per month and a 28 percent increase in annual sales lost due to power outages on average.
4
 
Interpreted differently, a one standard deviation increase in the propensity to bribe is associated with 
																																																								
3  Furthermore, Eberhard et al. (2008) find that gross domestic product (GDP) losses due to power outages can be as 
high as 6 percent. Mishra et al. (2009) find bidirectional Granger causality between energy consumption and GDP, 
exhibiting positive impacts, for a panel of Pacific Island countries. Kessides (1993) provides a comprehensive 
review of an older set of literature on the impacts of infrastructure on economic development, focusing mostly on 
the implications for economic growth but also highlighting the importance of infrastructure for improvements in 
other development indicators that capture quality of life. 
4 According to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, the data source for our outage data, a power outage occurs when 
there is equipment malfunction from the failure of adequate supply of power. Brownouts are also considered power 
outages. Respondents were asked to calculate the number of outages in a typical month, so if outages are seasonal, 
this does not include months in which outages are most frequent or when they are most infrequent. 
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experiencing 7 more power outages per month and a 10% increase in annual sales lost due to power 
outages. 
Our empirical setting is motivated by the observation that electricity networks exhibit common-
pool resource (CPR) characteristics in which the resource (the shared electricity grid) faces the risk of 
being over-exploited due to a tension between individual rationality and social efficiency. It may be 
rational for individual firms to offer bribes to secure electricity connections for business operations, but in 
aggregate, such connections that create ‘unmanaged demand’ may overload the electrical grid. In this 
context, bribing serves as a proxy for over-use. Consider the case of a firm bribing a power supplier 
employee for an electricity connection. This employee may not disclose the activity to management, and 
thus the power that is supplied to the firm conditional on the bribe is not accounted for in the power 
supply model. Without knowledge of this bribe, management is left without a true estimate of the quantity 
of electricity it needs to provide to the grid and a supply-demand imbalance can occur, negatively 
impacting operational efficiency.
5
  If there is a high incidence of this activity across firms sharing the 
same electrical wires, the system may become overburdened by the ‘unmanaged demand’. This 
inefficiency can lead to system failure. Essentially, while one may reasonably expect that bribes for 
electricity ensure its provision, an abundance of this activity on a shared system may adversely impact the 
resource quality in aggregate. If we believe that bribing is a good proxy for over-use of electricity, then 
our results suggest that this overexploitation of electricity, due in part to consumer behavior, weakens the 
grid and makes it more vulnerable to power outages. This mirrors outcomes of the well-known CPR 
problem, constituting a type of social dilemma in which rationality at the individual level leads to an 
outcome that is not optimal from the perspective of the group. See Appendix A for more details on how 
electricity as a service exhibits CPR characteristics, with a particular focus on how electricity is rival and 
non-excludable. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to study how corrupt behavior at the consumer level 
impacts the demand side of the electricity sector. A body of empirical research specifically focusing on 
corruption’s implications for infrastructure sectors and growth has emerged over the past few decades,
6
 
some of which focuses on electricity. While the question of how corruption, in its broad sense, impacts 
																																																								
5 Expanding upon the traditional framework of thinking of natural resources, similar CPR stories are applicable to 
congestion and infrastructure such as traffic on highways. In the general CPR framework, individuals can consume a 
common resource to the individual’s benefit but with an associated social cost: if aggregate consumption exceeds 
that which is supplied, the quality of the resource deteriorates or perhaps diminishes entirely. If overconsumption 
occurs in the form of bribes for electricity connections that are not accounted for in electricity providers’ supply 
models, total demand can exceed that which is expected and supplied. 
6 For instance, Fisman and Svensson (2007) show that bribery is negatively correlated with firm growth and Bah and 
Fang (2015) show that business environment—which includes a measure of corruption—is negatively associated 
with productivity and output in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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the power sector and its performance is not new, very few papers address the issue of reliability.
7
 Most of 
the existing literature measures corruption at the country level (rather than consumer level) and focuses 
on the electricity sector supply side impacts (i.e., generation, transmission, and distribution) rather than 
demand side impacts (i.e., how end-users experience and consume electricity as a service through 
reliability). For example, a few studies have shown the adverse effects of corruption measured at the 
country level on electricity distribution efficiency and transmission and distribution (T&D) losses. Smith 
(2004) uses cross-sectional data to analyze how T&D losses vary according to country-level corruption 
perception indices. Similarly, Estache, Goicoechea, and Trujillo (2009) study the impact of country-level 
corruption and utility reforms on electricity supply efficiency. While the authors refer to T&D losses as a 
proxy for quality of service, T&D losses do not capture how the service reliability is actually experienced 
by end-users, such as through power outages or some other direct measure of reliability as felt by 
consumers. Lastly, Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) and Wren-Lewis (2013) consider political economy factors 
affecting the electricity sector at a more micro level, but they focus on how firms on the supply side 
(distribution) are impacted by corruption rather than those on the demand side.  
 Overall, our study makes three main contributions. Primarily, we offer the first empirical study of 
how consumer level corrupt behavior on the demand side of the electricity sector negatively impacts the 
reliability of power received, which is contrary to the intuition that bribing secures the intended rewards 
of reliable service. Offering insights into the nature of the electricity grid as a CPR, we motivate the 
importance of studying corrupt behavior at the consumer level and its impact in aggregate to offer insights 
into one angle for policy and governance interventions aiming to improve reliability. Second, we 
contribute to the small but growing literature on large socio-technical systems exhibiting CPR 
characteristics.
8
 The problem of sharing common resources underlies many large-scale conflicts that are 
critical to a high functioning economy, from challenges related to global warming and the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions to the use of man-made resource systems like bridges and irrigation canals. 
First-best consumption of CPRs is often difficult, and thus consideration of these complex socio-technical 
systems from this perspective sheds light on institutional design and regulatory mechanisms for fostering 
second-best consumption. Lastly, given the importance of infrastructure and the reliability of its services 
																																																								
7 Stalon (1997) discusses the electric sector governance problem generally, focusing on a subset of problems that 
must be solved to preserve the reliability of bulk power systems in restructure electricity industries, however no 
empirical analysis is conducted. Infrastructure operations—such as electricity provision—are particularly vulnerable 
to corruption (Bergara, Henisz, and Spiller, 1998; Dal Bó, 2006) thus drawing increasing interest from researchers, 
decision-makers, and policymakers to explore mechanisms for reducing its impacts on infrastructure performance 
(Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2011). This makes it a particularly relevant empirical setting for studying electricity 
reliability.	
8 For instance, see Künneke and Finger (2009) and Kiesling (2009) for discussions of infrastructure systems as 
CPRs. 
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for economic growth, this paper contributes a new insight for fostering development and growth more 
broadly. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe our empirical model 
for the preferred specifications. We describe the data in Section III, results in Section IV, and robustness 
checks in Section V. We conclude with policy implications in Section VI.  
 
2.4 Empirical Model  
We estimate the impact of the propensity to bribe for electricity connections on power outages 
and commercial losses due to power outages using repeated cross-sections, following the simple linear 
model for i firms: 
 
�! = �������! + ��!
!
+ �! + �! + ��! + ��! + �!                                        (2.1) 
 
where �! is electricity reliability for firm i (either the average number of power outages experienced by 
the firm monthly or the percentage of total sales lost due to power outages annually) and  ������! is 
propensity to bribe for an electricity connection.  �! is a matrix of firm- and country-level control 
variables described in Section III and �! are year fixed effects to account for macroeconomic fluctuations, 
technology changes, and energy price shocks. We control for unobservables across countries with country 
fixed effects, �!, capturing inherent differences in power system characteristics.
9
 Firm size dummies, ��!, 
control for differences in power outages experienced across firms of different sizes, sector fixed effects, 
��!, capture the importance of electricity as an input to operations, and �! is the disturbance term.  
There are three identification concerns that could lead OLS estimation of Equation 2.1 to produce 
biased estimates of �. First, bribery could be endogenous due to simultaneity bias. One can imagine that 
firms have an incentive to bribe for electricity connections or a more secure service if the electricity 
infrastructure is in poor condition already. In other words, perhaps it is not the case that bribery for 
electricity connections leads to more power outages but rather that the existence of a weak electricity 
infrastructure that suffers from a high incidence of power outages provides firms with an incentive to 
bribe for a more secure service. If this is the case, then our specification suffers from simultaneity bias. 
We use an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to account for the endogeneity of bribery behavior with the 
instruments described in Section III. 
Second, we are unable to separately identify the effect of bribery and country fixed effects 
without intra-country variation in bribery. In our sample, we include only firms located in countries with 
																																																								
9 We also estimating specifications that interacted year and country fixed effects to capture countrywide trends and 
the results were the same.		
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intra-country variation in the propensity to bribe. Ideally, to examine this CPR setting, we would have 
grid-level data to identify the aggregated effect of firm bribes on grid reliability. Given our firm-level data 
that do not include location identifiers, we rely on the assumption that electricity grids and their territories 
are defined sub-nationally and that a firm’s propensity to bribe is representative of bribe propensity of 
other firms extracting power from the same grid.
10
  
 Third, electricity reliability could be correlated with shocks at the firm level over the time period, and 
our repeated cross-sections do not allow us to include firm-level fixed effects as we would in a traditional 
panel setting. As such, we create a means-based pseudo panel in which cohorts of firms with similar 
characteristics are tracked over time to strengthen our identification strategy. Section III describes the 
characteristics on which we group observations. The observations for each cohort consist of averages of 
the variable values so that what results is a pseudo panel with repeated observations for C cohorts over T 
periods. The model specification for pseudo-panel regressions is written generally as 
 
�!" = �������!" + ��!"
!
+ �! + �! + �!" , � = 1,… ,�;   � = 1,… ,�,                           (2.2)  
 
where �!" is the average value of all observed �!"’s within cohort c in period t, and likewise, the other 
variables are also averages of observed values within each cohort c in period t. Here, �! are cohort-level 
fixed effects (the average of firm fixed effects in cohort c). Identification rests upon within cohort 
variation for a given year and variation over time for a given cohort. Year fixed effects allow for time 
effects to be accounted for in a flexible way, measuring the impact of sector trends, and time-invariant 
unobservables at the cohort level are controlled for with cohort fixed effects. This method of averaging 
within cohorts also helps to remove potential measurement error at the firm level (Antman and McKenzie, 
2007). One last challenge to bear in mind is that the number of firms in each cohort and time period is not 
the same, which could induce heteroskedasticity. We follow Dargay (2007) and Huang (2007) to correct 
for this by weighing all cohort variables by the square root of the number of firms in each cohort. Because 




Our dataset includes both firm-level and country-level variables that come from three different 
public databases. We collect firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, including 
																																																								
10 If firms extracting power from the same grid provide different answers regarding the need to bribe, then both the 
magnitude and significance of our parameter estimates will be lower, making our estimates upper bounds. 
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information on topics that span electricity infrastructure, corruption, and performance measures.
11
 We 
match firms to country-level data from the World Bank’s Development Indicators Database
12
 for various 
control variables and the World Bank’s Governance Indicators Database
13
 for country-level corruption 
and governance controls. Our full dataset covers 72,617 firms across 118 countries from 2006 to 2012. 
Once we omit firms that are in countries without intra-country variation in bribery propensity, our sample 
includes 69,283 observations across 104 countries. Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics for this 
preferred dataset, which is what we use throughout our main analysis. There is substantial variation in 
each of the variables across firms as well as across countries. Table B2.1 in Appendix 2B provides the 
same summary for the full dataset.  
 









     Outages (monthly avg.) 38,753 12.52 26.6 0 600 
Losses (% of total sales) 23,199 7.667 11.73 0 100 
Bribery in Electricity Sector 
     Propensity to Bribe 11,858 0.14 0.347 0 1 
Firm-Level Controls 
     Working Capital (% internal) 57,919 69.43 34.89 0 100 
Public (indicator) 68,493 0.0601 0.238 0 1 
Percent Private 67,800 89.13 29.09 0 100 
Generator Ownership (indicator) 49,307 0.288 0.453 0 1 
Sales (annual) (LCUs) 61,483 7.76E+10 1.15E+13 0 2.70E+15 
Country-Level Controls 
     GDP per Capita 67,166 10,024 6,929 568.6 29,321 
Population Density 69,283 104 175.8 1.72 1,125 
Inflation (%) 64,684 6.416 5.78 -2.41 34.7 
Government Indicator Average 69,283 -0.0369 0.536 -1.584 1.77 
Source: World Bank Databases 
     
 
Our primary variable of interest, bribery, is measured by whether the firm reported in the 
Enterprise Surveys that informal gifts or payments are generally expected or required in order to obtain an 
electrical connection (1=yes or 0=no).
14
 Although this measure is not an explicit indication of executed 
																																																								
11 Available at enterprisesurveys.org. 
12 Available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
13 Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.			
14 Some may question whether reliable firm-level data on corruption can be collected—it is often the view that it is 
near impossible to collect reliable quantitative information on corruption given the secretive nature of corrupt 
activities (Reinekka and Svensson, 2002). However, Kaufmann (1997) argues that with appropriate survey methods 
and interview techniques, firm managers are willing to discuss it with relative candor, and firm managers can be 
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bribes, we assume that a higher propensity to bribe for electricity connections (or the perception of its 
necessity for obtaining an electricity connection) is reflective of higher incidence of bribery for electricity 
connections in the region that the firm is operating.
15
 In this context, a higher incidence or likelihood of 
bribing at the firm level is likely associated with a higher incidence of bribery on that firm’s electrical 
grid in aggregate. As a proxy for grid failure, we consider two firm-level variables that reflect the quality 
of service received: average number of monthly power outages and percentage of total annual sales lost 
specifically due to power outages.
16
 We assume that more frequent power outages at the firm level are 
related to more frequent outages on the broader network from which that firm extracts power.
17
 We 
discuss how we address this potential sensitivity with robustness checks in Section V. 
One also may be concerned that a propensity to bribe is correlated with poor country management 
or infrastructure, which impacts the electricity sector and reliability. The World Bank Development 
Indicators Database and the World Bank Governance Indicators Database provide country-level data on 
important economic and governance variables that underlie the overall infrastructure conditions within a 
region, providing us with controls for inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the electricity system 
that could be contributing to power outages. Specifically, we include three country-level macroeconomic 
variables that are related to the potential quality of infrastructure: GDP per capita (PPP constant 2005 
international dollars), population density (people per square km of land area), and the inflation rate (based 
on the consumer price index). We assume that wealthier countries generally have more resources 
available for investing in infrastructure, which could enhance the baseline quality and stability of the 
electricity system. Population density is included since it is sometimes suggested that T&D losses, a 
proxy for the stability of a power system, are related to population density.
18
 Inflation rate is included to 
proxy for general macroeconomic instability and its relation to infrastructure conditions. 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
given the right incentives to cooperate and truthfully report their experiences. While survey data are never perfect, 
the Enterprise Surveys are the most robust resource for the firm-level variables we wish to study. 
15 The way in which we observe bribery does not allow us to identify the effectiveness of bribes in obtaining 
electrical connections or securing reliable power since the data do not explicitly track whether a bribe was successful 
in guaranteeing service. In fact, the bribery measure does not even capture whether bribes were executed or bribes 
for turning power on and off—it just proxies for the potential initial connection itself and whether firms are more 
likely to need to bribe for electricity. Our objective is not to ask whether bribes are effective mechanisms for 
obtaining secure power but rather to understand whether more bribery incidence overburdens the grid enough to 
contribute to power outages.  
16 Both of these variables are self-reported estimates provided by firm management in the Enterprise Surveys. 
17 Although some of these outages could be planned, our data do not differentiate between planned outages and 
unplanned outages, and thus we take the monthly estimates as being proxies for total outages. If there is bias due to 
unplanned outages, it is likely relatively consistent across entities once we control for the firm’s country location.	
18 See MIT (2011) for discussion. 
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Additionally, the World Bank Governance Indicators Database provides data that capture six 
broad aspects of governance and corruption at the country-level.
19
 Each index ranges from -2.5 (weak 
governance) to 2.5 (strong governance). Including these in our analysis helps us to control for the impact 
of broader institutional weaknesses and vulnerabilities that contribute to the quality and management of 
infrastructure services. The energy sector is a prime target for, and source of, corruption, and it is often 
riddled with other governance issues. For instance, a few attributes that contribute to this vulnerability 
include the potential for generating considerable economic rents, the need for large capital investments, 
and the central role of government agencies. There is often a lack of transparency of decision-making as 
well as a dearth of effective legal systems for reducing the risk of decision-makers abusing their power. 
Because the governance indicators are highly correlated with each other and capture similar uncertainties 
that impact investment and operating conditions, we average the six indicators to create a single 
‘governance quality’ control variable.
20
   
We include one firm-level control variable that is intended to capture a broader countrywide 
characteristic that is related to infrastructure quality: access to finance. Provision of end-user finance is 
often needed to overcome the barriers related to the high initial capital costs associated with gaining 
access to energy services.  More working capital from internal sources rather than banks or microfinance 
arrangements may imply access to finance barriers in the economy, which are commonly cited as a major 
obstacle to investing in and improving electricity infrastructure and thus the quality of energy services 
(UNEP 2012). We proxy for this barrier with the percentage of the firm’s total the working capital that 
the firm finances with internal sources.  
We also may be concerned with firms receiving preferential treatment in ways that could impact 
the quality of electricity provided to the firm. For instance, if a firm (or firms within a certain industry) 
contributes significantly to the economy, it may have more bargaining power to ensure that it receives 
high quality electricity. We include total annual sales (logged) to control for this, assuming that high sales 
figures reflect a large contribution to the economy and the potential for receiving preferential treatment. 
Two variables related to firm ownership are also included with the intention of capturing factors 
corresponding to heightened perceptions of corruption (Galang et al., 2013) and dealings with public 
officials in acquiring certain services (Rienikka and Svensson, 2002): public ownership (as an indicator 
variable) and the percent of the firm that is privately owned. Some evidence has shown that state-owned 
firms have a lowered sensitivity to corruption, and the fusion of firm ownership with the state can make 
																																																								
19 The measures include voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. These measures combine the views of 
citizens, enterprises, and expert survey respondents based on 32 individual data sources from non-governmental 
organization, international organizations, private sector firms, and think tanks. 
20 We also ran regressions with each indicator included separately or in various combinations and our results 
remained stable.	
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firms less sensitive to the negative impacts of corruption, potentially influencing the relationship between 
the firm and service provider in a way that impacts the quality of service provided. Furthermore, private 
firms often bear the brunt of corruption whereas state-owned firms that benefit from the state could be 
more likely to turn a blind eye to the activity (Galang et al., 2013). Other work has shown that firms 
dealing with public officials whose actions directly affect the firm’s business operations usually have to 
pay bribes, such as when acquiring public infrastructure services (Reinikka and Svensson, 2002). Each of 
these factors could contribute to a firm receiving preferential treatment in electricity service provision. 
Lastly, we include generator ownership as a control variable since generator ownership may 
indicate an anticipation of poor service, which may be reflective of the baseline electricity system 
reliability. More firms are likely to own generators in regions where power reliability is weaker. 
Furthermore, if a firm owns a generator, then there is little to no need for electricity connection bribes 
since onsite generation is possible in the face of poor reliability.  
We propose a set of five firm-level instruments for bribery: female ownership, foreign ownership, 
obtainment of an internationally recognized quality certification, age of the firm, and the practices of 
competitors in the informal sector being a major obstacle to operations. Our choice of instruments was 
motivated by a review of the literature that empirically explores the determinants of bribery. Female 
ownership and foreign ownership both have been shown to be associated with a lower propensity to bribe 
(Swamy et al., 2001; Dollar et al., 2001; Clarke, 2014). When women are better represented in 
government and the workforce, less corruption pervades. Foreign-owned firms may have a stronger 
incentive than domestic firms not to pay bribes because foreign investors in developed economies might 
be concerned about the laws in their home countries (Lee et al., 2010; Clarke, 2014). We measure female 
ownership as a dummy variable (equal to one when firms have any female participation in ownership). 
We measure foreign ownership as the percentage of the firm that is foreign-owned because a firm’s 
bargaining power increases as its percentage of foreign ownership increases, and a firm’s bargaining 
power impacts whether bribes are demanded of them. We expect higher percentages of foreign ownership 
to be associated with a lower vulnerability to corruption and less propensity to bribe (Lee et al., 2010). 
Similarly, we suspect that firms that have obtained international quality certificates may be less 
likely to bribe. We measure this as an indicator variable based on the Enterprise Survey question about 
whether the firm has received a certification related to quality management from the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). We assume that the management of these firms maintains 
transparency and enforcement guidelines that help to reduce their tendency to fulfill bribe demands or to 
offer bribes. Furthermore, obtaining international quality certifications could improve the motivation, 
awareness, and morale of employees (World Bank, 2014), potentially reducing the firm’s propensity to 
bribe. 
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Age of the firm is used as an instrument because of the notion found in the literature that older 
firms might have different experiences than younger firms when interacting with government officials. 
New firms may be less visible and incur fewer bribe demands. On the other hand, new firms may require 
more permit and license applications, possibly demand more bribes because of more frequent interactions 
with government officials (Clarke, 2014). Nonetheless, the age of the firm has been cited as being related 
to bribery propensity, as demonstrated in Lee et al. (2010). We follow Lee et al. (2010) and measure age 
of the firm by the number of years since foundation. 
Lastly, we instrument with a measure of how severe of an obstacle the informal sector is to firm 
operations. In many developing countries, the informal sector is a major engine for employment and 
growth (Schneider, 2002). There are numerous motivations for firms to operate underground (Johnson et 
al., 1997; Johnson et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2001; May et al., 2002), and operating 
unofficially is sometimes considered to be a mechanism for avoiding the predatory behavior of 
government officials that seek bribes from those with officially registered activities (Lavallée and 
Roubaud, 2009). At the same time, entrepreneurs may bribe public officials in an attempt to secure their 
informal activities, and indeed, informal sector firms may be exposed to demands for bribes even more so 
than formal firms (Lavallée and Roubaud, 2009). If firms believe they are competing with other firms that 
are bribing, such as those in the informal sector, there may be a greater incentive to also supply bribes to 
secure services. In other words, if firm management believes the informal sector is an obstacle to 
operations and that firms in the informal sector are bribing, it may believe it also needs to bribe in order to 
maintain a competitive advantage. We use the response to one of the questions on the Enterprise Surveys 
to proxy for this that asked firms to rank the severity of the obstacle on a scale from 1 (not severe) to 4 
(very severe).  
It is possible that these instruments could be correlated with country-level institutions and 
unobserved conditions that we cannot control for in our analysis. For instance, there may be some 
unobserved characteristic of a country’s cultural environment that impacts the likelihood of female 
participation in ownership, or perhaps fewer firms in certain countries obtain quality certifications 
because the business climate makes it nearly impossible to meet the standards. Furthermore, perhaps 
firms view the informal sector as a severe obstacle because it is indeed a more significant component of 
the economy in countries characterized by a less stable business climate. It is not possible to test whether 
these instruments are correlated with unobserved determinants of power outages, however we can 
examine the correlations between the instruments and other covariates, which are intended to capture the 
underlying macroeconomic fabric within which the firms are operating and could be correlated with 
similar unobservables to provide evidence that our choice of instruments has strong theoretical grounding. 
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Table B2.2 in Appendix 2B presents the correlation matrix. We can see that the instruments 
exhibit extremely low correlations with nearly all of our other covariates, mostly with correlations under 
0.10. This gives us more confidence that our instruments are not correlated with unobserved determinants 
of power outages. There are a few exceptions, however. For instance, foreign ownership is highly 
correlated with private ownership (� = −0.90). To account for this, we run regressions with various 
combinations of the instrument set as a robustness check.   
Finally, designing and setting up a pseudo panel is not trivial. Cohorts must be groups of firms 
that share common characteristics, where each firm is a member of only one cohort, and cohorts must 
have fixed membership based on characteristics observed for all observations within the sample. One 
natural characteristic to base cohort groupings upon is region of operation. Unfortunately, because we do 
not have enough countries that are repeated consecutively through the sample period, grouping on country 
is not effective. As such, we group based on geographic region following the World Bank classifications. 
Grouping only on region, however, is extremely limiting. Therefore, we group on two other firm 
attributes that likely affect a firm’s bribery behavior—firm size and sector—and one other country-level 
variable that captures the broader corruption climate as a proxy for the propensity to engage in corrupt 
activities, the ‘control of corruption’ World Bank Governance Indicator. 
Our selection of firm size was motivated by empirical research showing that it may be related to 
bribing behavior (Abed and Gupta, 2002; Anderson and Gray, 2006; Lee et al., 2010).
21
 Firm size is 
defined by the number of employees, where 5-19 employees indicates the firm is small, 20-99 is medium, 
and 100+ is large. Because size is still a relatively crude instrument on which to group, we also group on 
sector as a characteristic affecting the incentive to bribe. The choice of sector is motivated by it being a 
proxy for electricity demand or the firm’s reliance on electricity for operations and revenue generation. 
For example, both Apple and Ford are large companies, but their energy consumption profiles are 
unlikely to be similar. Therefore, their propensity to bribe for power is probably different since their 
business models rely upon it differently. Essentially, grouping by sector aims to capture the firm’s 




Grouping firms based on ‘control of corruption’, which characterizes the conditions of the 
country in which each firm operates, helps us to overcome the challenge of not being able to group on 
country itself. Perhaps more importantly, it captures the macro-level conditions that we expect would 
																																																								
21 These studies show that smaller firms pay bribes more frequently and pay more bribes as a share of revenues 
relative to larger firms. 
22 Some studies have shown that there are industry level differences in bribery (Clarke, 2014). For instance, Herrera 
and Rodriguez (2003) show that manufacturing firms are less prone to bribe than service sector firms. Lee et al. 
(2010) show that firm size is negatively associated with the likelihood of bribery. 
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impact a firm’s propensity to bribe. The World Bank defines ‘control of corruption’ as ‘the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests’. The metric also measures the strength and 
effectiveness of a country’s policy and institutional framework to prevent corruption. One can imagine 
that a weaker control of corruption as defined in this way may enable more bribery. Furthermore, bribery 
is not just a problem related to corrupt behavior by firms offering bribes. Just as in any transaction, 
bribery transactions have both a supply side and a demand side. Officials with the power to offer 
government contracts, issue a license, or allocate some scarce resource can demand bribes, as well (Dixit, 
2013). This directly relates to ‘control of corruption’, which captures bribery demand. 
The control of corruption measure is an index combining up to 22 different assessments and 
surveys, each of which receives a different weight based upon estimated precision and country coverage. 
The indicator ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). We group firms based on which quartile they fall 
within based on the range of this measure in our sample. Again, we face the concern that this measure 
could change for firms over time, however we are not too concerned since the pace of change can be quite 
slow depending and depend on building the foundations for reform (Johnston, 2014). 
 
2.6 Results 
Table 2.2 presents our main results.
23
 The estimates consistently suggest that a higher propensity 
to bribe for an electricity connection is associated with more power outages and their related losses, or in 
other words, a less reliable electricity system. The coefficient estimates for bribery can be interpreted as 
the change in monthly power outages and the change in financial losses as a percentage of total sales, on 
average, associated with the propensity to bribe for electricity connections. When using an IV approach 
and including all controls, the propensity to bribe is associated with an increase of 20 power outages per 
month on average, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Interpreted another way, an increase 
in the propensity to bribe by one standard deviation is associated with about 7 more power outages per 
month. Furthermore, the propensity to bribe is associated with a 28% increase in financial losses due to 
power outages, or a one standard deviation increase in the propensity to bribe is associated with a 9.8% 
increase in losses (significant at the 5% level). For robustness purposes, Tables B2.6 and B2.8 in 
Appendix 2B provide sets of regression results where we add one control variable at a time to the IV 
																																																								
23 We do not include naïve (non-instrumented) regression results since the simultaneity bias renders such results 
invalid. However, we have confirmed that the direction of the bias is correct. When we do not instrument, the effect 
of bribes on outages is zero, implying a negative bias. We regressed bribe propensity on outages along with all 
controls and IVs as regressors and we found a negative coefficient estimate for outages. This can be explained by 
the lack of incentive to bribe for an electricity connection once outages are so frequent that purchasing a backup 
generator is a more reasonable substitute. The same exercise for financial losses confirms the direction of bias for 
those regressions as well.	
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specifications for outages and losses, respectively, in order to be more confident that the results are not 
driven by some unobservables related to our control variables. We see that the results are statistically 
significant in all cases and the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are relatively stable.  
 
Table 2.2:  IV Regressions for Monthly Power Outages and Financial Losses Due to Outages  
  Outages Outages Losses Losses 
Propensity to Bribe for an Electricity Connection 18.13 ** 20.51 ** 14.03 * 28.29 ** 
  (8.46) (9.29) (8.33) (12.41) 
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes 
Country-level controls No Yes No Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (year) Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3567 2106 1638 968 
F-statistic 4.89 6.05 4.43 4.02 
Under identification test (p-value) 0.0097 0.004 0.007 0.036 
Over identification test (p-value) 0.546 0.878 0.606 0.745 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
The findings from the pseudo-panel regressions also consistently support the conclusion that 
bribery adversely affects electricity reliability however the magnitudes of the parameter estimates are 
much higher. When including both cohort and time fixed effects in IV regressions, the propensity to bribe 
is associated with higher levels of both outcome variables. Table 2.3 summarizes these results, showing 
how we find positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates. Specifications 1 and 2 include all 
controls, and we drop the governance indicator average control variable in specifications 3 and 4 since 
this variable encapsulates one of the variables on which we formed the cohorts (‘control of corruption’). 
We present the first stage results for specifications 1 and 2 in Tables B2.10 and B2.11 of Appendix 2B, 
respectively. Examination of the first-stage regression results reveals that the instruments are stronger for 
the pooled OLS regressions. As such, we prefer the pooled OLS IV regression results presented in Table 







Table 2.3: Pseudo-Panel Regression Results, Instrumental Variables Approach 










Propensity to Bribe for an Electricity 
Connection 46.65 * 64.57 *** 52.04 * 48.71 ** 
  (26.96) (20.24) (26.87) (21.80) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (year) Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 302 239 302 239 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; errors are clustered on country 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
2.7 Robustness Checks 
To be sure our results hold when including all firms, we run IV regressions on the full dataset and 
show that the propensity to bribe for electricity connections is still statistically significant for both 
outcome measures and stable in magnitude with our previous findings (see Table 2.4). We also conduct a 
similar exercise as with the preferred specifications to demonstrate that the magnitude and significance of 
coefficient estimates are stable despite which control variables are included, and these results are 
provided in Tables B2.12 and B2.13 in Appendix 2B for outages and commercial losses, respectively. 
The estimates fall within a similar range as they did in the preferred specifications (15 to 22 for power 
outages and 15% to 30% for losses).  
 
Table 2.4:  IV Pooled OLS Regression Results for Full Dataset 
  Outages Losses 
Propensity to Bribe for an Electricity Connection 22.01 ** 30.40 ** 
  (9.75) (13.15) 
Observations 1032 2183 
F-statistic 6.003 3.69 
Under identification test (p-value) 0.004 0.043 
Over identification test (p-value) 0.885 0.746 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Both specifications include firm-level and country-level controls, and country, sector, firm size, 
and year dummies. 
 
The second biggest concern is that even though there exists within-country variation in bribery, 
the data do not allow us to attribute individual firms to specific grids in order to capture some aggregated 
grid-level impact. This creates uncertainty as to whether spatial heterogeneity actually exists. Therefore, 
we run regressions on data from firms only located in geographically large countries to see if the results 
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hold when we are more confident that respondents are indeed spatially dispersed. We first define 
‘geographically large’ as countries that are geographically larger than the Q3 size found in our dataset, 
which is 1,280,000 square kilometers. Our results for power outages and financial losses are presented in 
specifications 1 and 2, respectively, of Table 2.5. The findings hold for power outages, however 
significance is lost in the financial losses regressions. We consider two additional definitions of 
‘geographically large’: countries that are 2 million square kilometers or larger and those that are 4 million 
square kilometers or larger, which were two cutoffs that appeared to be natural breaking points when 
plotting the data. We present these results in Table 2.5 as well. Columns 3 and 4 present the results for 
countries larger than 2 million square kilometers. Columns 5 and 6 present the results for countries larger 
than 4 million square kilometers.  For countries greater than 2 million square kilometers, the results 
maintain significance for power outages but it is lost again for financial losses. For countries greater than 
4 million square kilometers, significance is maintained for both outcome measures.  
A positive coefficient estimate for each regression and significance for each regression is 
maintained on outages. While the F-statistics indicate that these regressions suffer from weak 
instrumentation, specification 1 has greatest power while also exhibiting a relatively high F-statistic, and 
thus it is our preferred specification of this set. Demonstrating that bribery propensity maintains a positive 
coefficient that is significant at the 5% level while instrumenting and with all controls on this set of 
geographically large countries provides us with more confidence that our data exhibit spatial 
heterogeneity in bribery propensity. 
 
Table 2.5:  IV Pooled OLS Regression Results for Geographically Large Countries 
 
Outages Losses Outages Losses Outages Losses 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Propensity to Bribe  5.40 ** 0.411 3.22 *** 5.45 2.61 ** 6.82 * 
  (2.54) (8.59) (0.99) (3.60) (1.09) (3.77) 
Observations 646 224 322 105 322 105 
F-statistic 12.34 0.551 2.21 0.565 2.48 0.861 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Each specification is instrumented. All specifications include firm-level and country-level controls, and 
country, sector, firm size, and year dummies. Specifications differ according to the cut-off in country geographic size 
for defining ‘geographically large’. Columns 1 & 2 consider countries that are geographically larger than the Q3 size 
in our dataset as ‘geographically large’; Columns 3 & 4 define geographically large as larger than 2 million square 
kilometers; Columns 5 & 6 define geographically large as larger than 4 million square kilometers. 
 
A third concern that arises is that not all five of the instruments are significant determinants of 
bribery for electricity connections, as demonstrated by the first-stage regression results.
24
 While the 




stage regressions for both outcome variables, the other three IVs are not. Therefore, we want to be sure 
that our results are not sensitive to which instruments we include. We run five additional instrumental 
variable regressions for each outcome measure, adding one instrument at a time, and find that the results 
are relatively consistent across specifications. When regressing on power outages, in all specifications 
except for one, we maintain significance and find that bribery is associated with 19 to 21 more power 
outages per month (see Table 2.6). Similarly, when regressing on commercial losses, in all specifications 
except for one, we maintain significance and find that bribery is associated with an increase in losses 20% 
to 40% of annual sales (see Table 2.7). For the two specifications where significance is lost, the 
coefficient estimates remain positive. These findings are consistent with those in our preferred 
specifications. Our results pass the under- and over-identification tests, and thus we favor inclusion of the 
entire set of IVs in the preferred specifications given our review of the literature and the theoretical 
justification for their inclusion. 
 
Table 2.6:  IV Robustness Checks for Pooled OLS Regressions - Outages 
  
     
Propensity to Bribe 13.77 19.45 * 21.45 ** 21.26 ** 20.51 ** 
  (16.11) (10.83) (10.23) (9.74) (9.29) 
Included Instruments 
     
Informal Sector Obstacle X X X X X 
Age of Firm 
 
X X X X 
Quality Certification 
  
X X X 
Female Ownership 
   
X X 
Percent Foreign         X 
Observations 4215 2413 2322 2106 2106 
F-statistic 6.82 8.82 7.58 5.26 6.05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include firm-level and country-level controls, and country, sector, firm size, and year 
dummies. 
 
Lastly, it is possible that the way in which we chose to group firms for forming the pseudo-panel 
introduced bias since the selection of attributes on which to group were largely motivated by existing 
studies in the literature. One attribute that might be particularly troubling is our choice of grouping firms 
based on the region in which they are located. Each region includes numerous countries of varying 
macroeconomic conditions, institutional challenges, cultures, and more. We consider omitting this 
variable as one that we group upon and group firms based on only firm size, sector, and ‘control of 
corruption’. While firm size and sector are both cited as potential determinants of firm-level bribing 
behavior, ‘control of corruption’ still captures the broader country-level stability that may influence a 
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Table 2.7:  IV Robustness Checks for Pooled OLS Regressions - Commercial Losses 
  
     
Propensity to Bribe 40.32 * 13.52 20.65 * 24.45 * 28.29 ** 
  (20.87) (12.95) (12.18) (12.88) (12.41) 
Included Instruments 
     
Informal Sector Obstacle X X X X X 
Age of Firm 
 
X X X X 
Quality Certification 
  
X X X 
Female Ownership 
   
X X 
Percent Foreign         X 
Observations 2455 1155 1117 968 968 
F-statistic 6.05 5.78 5.29 3.61 4.02 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All specifications include firm-level and country-level controls, and country, sector, firm size, and year 
dummies. 
 
firm’s behavior. The results from these regressions, when instrumenting with the full set of instruments 
and including all controls, are provided in Table B2.14 of Appendix 2B. Once again, the positive 
coefficient estimate is maintained for power outages at the 5% level. While significance is lost when 
regressing on commercial losses, the sign remains positive. 
Overall, the robustness checks demonstrate that the positive coefficient findings are maintained 
with significance in all cases when regressing on monthly power outages, but the significance of results 
when regressing on commercial losses is more sensitive to the selection of data and instruments. 
Nonetheless, the positive coefficient estimate is maintained across all robustness checks. Furthermore, the 
power outages outcome is the measure that more directly captures the phenomenon that we aim to 
measure in this analysis. The goal is to identify whether more illegal consumption of electricity 
contributes to a less reliable electricity system as measured by its failure. Monthly power outages are a 
direct reflection of power system failures, while commercial losses due to power outages are normalized 
to total firm sales and could be influenced by the firm’s dependence on electricity for operations and 
profitability as opposed to strictly capturing the occurrence of power outages. It is possible that the firm-
level controls and various sets of fixed effects did not fully control for this influence.  
The positive coefficient estimates of consistent magnitude maintained across all robustness check 
specifications when regressing on power outages provides us with more confidence in our findings. That 





Previous work has demonstrated the importance of electricity reliability for economic growth and 
development, however the underlying causes of poor electricity reliability in developing countries have 
gone relatively unstudied. We aimed to narrow this gap in the literature by focusing on the role of 
corruption and its impact on reliability, offering the first empirical study to our knowledge of how 
consumer-level corrupt behavior on the demand side of the electricity sector negatively impacts the 
service provided. In our analysis, the propensity to bribe for an electricity connection is associated with an 
increase of 20 power outages per month and a 28% increase in annual sales lost due to power outages on 
average. Our results are robust across a range of specifications based upon repeated cross-sections and a 
means-based pseudo-panel, showing that bribes are closely related to poorer reliability. This implies that 
one effective governance intervention for improving reliability may be to focus on reducing bribes for 
electricity connections, perhaps through enhanced transparency, oversight, and enforcement. 
Furthermore, we argue that our findings can be explained in the context of the well-known CPR 
problem, where rationality at the individual level leads to an outcome that is not optimal from the 
perspective of the group. Studying corruption at the firm level allowed us to observe what appears to be 
rational self-interested behavior—bribes for electricity connections—and correlate it with an outcome that 
proxies for reduced quality of service: power outages. Power outages occur more frequently when a 
system is weak, and if we believe that bribery for electricity connections is a reasonable proxy for over-
consumption, then these bribes facilitate a weaker state of the electrical system that is more vulnerable to 
failure. This phenomenon parallels a tragedy of the commons story: when users fail to internalize the 
congestion costs that they impose on others, inefficient consumption occurs and resource quality 
diminishes. 
Ensuring adequate electricity reliability is complex, particularly in a developing country context. 
The challenges extend far beyond the capacity to invest in the physical infrastructure. It was the aim of 
this paper to highlight the relevance of just one of these underlying issues—corruption—and shed light on 
the potential of policies and governance interventions that focus on reducing corruption at the consumer 
level in the quest for improving electricity reliability.  
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2.11 Appendix A: Electricity as a Common Pool Resource 
  A common pool resource (CPR) is a resource system (natural or man-made) that is sufficiently 
large to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude consumers from obtaining benefits from its use, 
exhibiting both rival and non-excludable characteristics (Ostrom, 1990). Such goods are rival (or 
subtractable) in the sense that multiple individuals can use the system while each individual’s 
consumption subtracts from the total quantity available to others. CPRs are non-excludable in the sense 
that it is difficult to keep those who have not paid for the good from consuming it. While CPR 
classifications are traditionally used to describe natural resource systems such as river basins, lakes, and 
forests, large socio-technical systems also fit within this framework, receiving limited attention in the 
literature to date despite their increasingly frequent CPR-related problems such as congestion and 
overuse, access regulation that prevents excessive appropriation, and poor investment incentives 
(Künneke and Finger, 2009). 
Electric power itself—the actual electrons consumed—is a pure private good. As individuals 
extract electrons from the grid, they subtract from the total quantity available to others.
25
 However, 
viewing electricity as strictly ‘electric power’ ignores the physical realities of electricity as it is actually 
transmitted, delivered, and consumed by end-users. That is, when individuals, households, and firms 
consume electricity, they are actually consuming a bundle of valued goods—electric power itself (the 
electrons), as well as reliability, voltage, and frequency (Toomey et al., 2005). Because each of these 
components relies upon the others, this bundle cannot be disaggregated. We cannot consume electric 
power without its associated voltage, and reliable power cannot be delivered without adequate voltage 
and frequency conditions in its associated wired network. For example, when there exist deviations in 
network frequency or voltage, generators can trip and the entire system can fail, leaving those connected 
to the system without electric power (Joskow and Tirole, 2007).  
While it is the electric power component of the bundle that makes electricity subtractable, it is the 
voltage, frequency, and reliability components that make it non-excludable. Regardless of what is paid by 
individual customers, and even despite differences in the actual power demanded and received, 
consumers on the same network share the same voltage, frequency, and probability of a power outage.  
To elaborate, there are at least two explanations for electricity being non-excludable that are 
related to the interdependence of these bundle components. First, systems are often spread across large 
geographical areas with difficult to monitor access points. While it is possible to track power 
consumption and identify irregularities with some precision given existing metering technology, not every 
“leak” in the distribution grid can be tracked because of the existence of non-technical losses (NTLs). 
																																																								
25 The only context in which multiple people can consume the same electrons is in a shared lighting space. 
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There are two different types of electricity losses
26
: technical losses, which are caused by losses in 
transmission or deficiencies in operations and physical infrastructure,
27
 and NTLs, which reflect 
inefficiencies resulting from actions outside of the physical power system. Common causes of NTLs 
include electricity theft, non-payment, and poor recordkeeping and oversight (World Bank, 2009). Any 
type of illegal connection to the power grid can be classified as electricity theft, and NTLs are most 




Although technical losses can be tracked and optimized, as this is simply an engineering issue 
that involves power system planning, NTLs are much more difficult to measure since actions external to 
the system are unaccounted for by system operators (Suriyamongkol, 2009). Even in the U.S., where there 
exists a legacy infrastructure and strong institutions, losses from electricity theft are significant.
29
 This 
suggests that access points are indeed difficult to monitor, even in well-established systems and in well-
developed countries.
30
 These NTLs can lead unstable power systems to fail or operate sub-optimally as 
they overload generation units and lead to over-voltage, which then can leave utilities without a true 
estimate of the quantity of electricity it needs to provide both legal and illegal customers (Depuru et al., 
2011).
31
   
																																																								
26 Electricity losses refer to electricity injected into a transmission and distribution grid that is not paid for by final 
end-users. 
27 These are inherent to the current transportation and associated with the infrastructure characteristics of the power 
system itself, consisting mainly of power dissipation in electrical system components such as transmission lines and 
transformers (Suriyamongkol, 2009). 
28 NTLs, however, exist in most regions of the world and are not strictly a function of country wealth. Lower GDP 
per capita appears to be associated with higher electricity losses, but there are exceptions. For instance, there are 
cases where GDP per capita is low but losses related to poor reliability are also low (Millard and Emmerton, 2009).  
29 In the U.S., electricity theft has been estimated to cost billions of dollars annually (Nesbit, 2000). American 
Electric Power (AEP), which covers about 200,000 square miles across eleven states as the largest investor-owned 
utility in the U.S., has indicated that its revenue protection-related billings (which are determined based on theft 
estimates from power system analysis software) exceed $3.2 million annually (Suriyamongkol, 2009).  
30 Suriyamongkol (2009) shows how today’s power system analyses tools cannot even capture known NTLs let 
alone those that are not known, which is necessary for balancing loads and ensuring adequate voltage levels and 
frequency for providing reliable power. Meter readings can help to detect some tampering with equipment and 
perhaps prevent some electricity theft, but meter data analytics techniques alone are only effective in identifying 
roughly 30% of power theft (EPRI, 2001). 
31 When NTLs are especially high, they can “trip” generation units and interrupt power supply (Sullivan, 2002). In 
order to maintain the system’s voltage near design level, generators must provide reactive power or else electricity 
equipment owned by customers, such as computers and refrigerators, will be damaged (Toomey et al., 2005). With 
multiple customers served simultaneously by a wired network and receiving the same voltage, any individual’s 
action has an impact on voltage levels. When voltage drops, generators produce excess power, which leads all 
generators connected to the system to spin faster. This increases the frequency of the network and excess energy is 
absorbed by the rotational energy contained in generators and turbines. Deviations from the design frequency of 
generators can cause extremely expensive damage, such as turbine blades spinning off their shafts (Toomey et al., 
2005). This can lead systems to shut down.	
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While the first argument for electricity being non-excludable applies to all four components of the 
electricity service bundle, similar logic related to tracking voltage and frequency requirements supports 
the second reason that electricity is non-excludable: it is difficult to monitor appropriated services even to 
legal customers, where services here refer to voltage and frequency requirements. Voltage and frequency 
are impacted directly by changes in load caused by others’ consumption, and thus NTLs that are 
impossible to track yet impact the voltage and frequency conditions on the shared network make it 
difficult to ensure appropriate voltage and frequency levels to all consumers in real-time. Since electricity 
cannot be stored economically today, supply and demand must always be in real-time balance in order to 
function appropriately, and relying upon only data from end-use meters and substations leaves system 
operators blind to the actual operating conditions on distribution lines. As such, the electric power 
network creates a system where customers consume a shared overall level of reliability in which it is 
impossible to exclude consumers from its benefits.
32
 
As such, the shared nature of frequency and voltage services, which are required for maintaining 
system reliability, make them susceptible to the collective action of individuals. This is the underlying 





32 This is because the transmission of electricity through networks follows the way of lease electrical resistance (i.e., 
loop flows of electric power), imposing mutual restrictions to users (Künneke and Finger, 2009). 
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2.12 Appendix B: Supporting Tables 
 









     Outages (monthly avg.) 40,522 12.15 26.1 0 600 
Losses (% of total sales) 24,424 7.375 11.56 0 100 
      Bribery in Electricity Sector 
     Propensity to Bribe 12,154 0.137 0.343 0 1 
      Firm-Level Controls 
     Working Capital (% internal) 60,272 69.33 34.67 0 100 
Public (indicator) 71,820 0.0585 0.235 0 1 
Percent Private 71,110 89 29.22 0 100 
Generator Ownership (indicator) 51,495 0.291 0.454 0 1 
Sales (annual) (LCUs) 64,499 7.41E+10 1.12E+13 0 2.70E+15 
      Country-Level Controls 
     GDP per Capita 70,500 10,066 6,977 568.6 29,321 
Population Density 72,617 107.9 176.4 1.72 1,125 
Inflation (%) 67,839 6.37 5.691 -2.41 34.7 
Government Indicator Average 72,617 -0.02 0.544 -1.584 1.77 
Source: World Bank Databases 
     
 
 












Informal Sector Obstacle 1.000 
    Quality Certification -0.124 1.000 
   Age of Firm 0.105 0.115 1.000 
  Female Ownership 0.002 0.052 0.027 1.000 
 Percent Foreign -0.070 0.192 0.038 -0.083 1.000 
Working Capital (% internal) -0.152 0.015 -0.127 -0.008 0.016 
Public -0.011 0.087 0.091 -0.002 0.053 
Percent Private 0.076 -0.200 -0.040 0.061 -0.900 
Generator Ownership 0.026 0.071 0.098 -0.057 0.116 
Log(total annual sales) -0.057 0.203 0.152 -0.042 0.172 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.004 0.009 0.083 -0.043 -0.078 
Log(population density) -0.042 0.138 -0.013 0.114 0.055 
Inflation -0.049 -0.113 -0.095 -0.058 -0.049 
Government Indicator 
Average 0.224 -0.008 0.321 -0.010 0.045 
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Table B2.3:10Within-Country Variation of Propensity to Bribe for Electricity Connections 
 
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Afghanistan 0.357 0.481 0 1 
Albania 0.197 0.401 0 1 
Angola 0.259 0.440 0 1 
Argentina 0.025 0.157 0 1 
Azerbaijan 0.300 0.464 0 1 
Bahamas 0.133 0.352 0 1 
Bangladesh 0.510 0.505 0 1 
Belarus 0.079 0.273 0 1 
Benin 0.478 0.511 0 1 
Bhutan 0.022 0.147 0 1 
Bolivia 0.027 0.163 0 1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.093 0.292 0 1 
Botswana 0.025 0.158 0 1 
Brazil 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Bulgaria 0.094 0.293 0 1 
Burkina Faso 0.192 0.398 0 1 
Burundi 0.148 0.359 0 1 
Cameroon 0.235 0.428 0 1 
Central African Republic 0.214 0.415 0 1 
Chad 0.472 0.506 0 1 
Chile 0.013 0.115 0 1 
China 0.058 0.233 0 1 
Colombia 0.035 0.183 0 1 
Congo 0.156 0.369 0 1 
Costa Rica 0.038 0.192 0 1 
Croatia 0.034 0.183 0 1 
Czech Republic 0.055 0.229 0 1 
DRC 0.534 0.503 0 1 
Dominican Republic 0.059 0.237 0 1 
Ecuador 0.097 0.297 0 1 
El Salvador 0.020 0.140 0 1 
Estonia 0.068 0.255 0 1 
Ethiopia 0.071 0.260 0 1 
Fiji 0.194 0.402 0 1 
Fyr Macedonia 0.118 0.325 0 1 
Gabon 0.200 0.410 0 1 
Gambia 0.313 0.468 0 1 
Georgia 0.029 0.171 0 1 
Ghana 0.333 0.476 0 1 
Guatemala 0.049 0.217 0 1 
Guinea 0.571 0.499 0 1 
Guinea Bissau 0.089 0.288 0 1 
Guyana 0.146 0.358 0 1 
Honduras 0.094 0.293 0 1 
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Table B2.3: continued 
Indonesia 0.286 0.454 0 1 
Iraq 0.319 0.468 0 1 
Kazakhstan 0.171 0.379 0 1 
Kenya 0.277 0.449 0 1 
Kosovo 0.091 0.292 0 1 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.208 0.415 0 1 
Lao PDR 0.283 0.455 0 1 
Latvia 0.057 0.233 0 1 
Lesotho 0.150 0.362 0 1 
Liberia 0.444 0.527 0 1 
Lithuania 0.026 0.162 0 1 
Madagascar 0.132 0.343 0 1 
Malawi 0.125 0.342 0 1 
Mali 0.326 0.471 0 1 
Mauritania 0.420 0.499 0 1 
Mauritius 0.029 0.169 0 1 
Mexico 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Moldova 0.044 0.208 0 1 
Mongolia 0.161 0.369 0 1 
Montenegro 0.154 0.376 0 1 
Mozambique 0.135 0.347 0 1 
Nepal 0.313 0.479 0 1 
Nicaragua 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Niger 0.148 0.362 0 1 
Nigeria 0.384 0.487 0 1 
Pakistan 0.683 0.469 0 1 
Panama 0.023 0.149 0 1 
Paraguay 0.132 0.340 0 1 
Peru 0.042 0.200 0 1 
Philippines 0.161 0.369 0 1 
Poland 0.077 0.270 0 1 
Romania 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Russia 0.187 0.390 0 1 
Samoa 0.208 0.415 0 1 
Senegal 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Serbia 0.137 0.348 0 1 
Sierra Leone 0.063 0.250 0 1 
Slovak Republic 0.045 0.213 0 1 
South Africa 0.055 0.229 0 1 
Sri Lanka 0.139 0.351 0 1 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.053 0.229 0 1 
St. Vincent and Grenadines 0.037 0.192 0 1 
Swaziland 0.087 0.288 0 1 
Tajikistan 0.329 0.473 0 1 
Tanzania 0.217 0.415 0 1 
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Table B2.3: continued 
Timor Leste 0.178 0.387 0 1 
Togo 0.261 0.449 0 1 
Tonga 0.588 0.507 0 1 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.047 0.213 0 1 
Turkey 0.051 0.220 0 1 
Uganda 0.176 0.384 0 1 
Ukraine 0.209 0.409 0 1 
Uruguay 0.017 0.130 0 1 
Uzbekistan 0.154 0.376 0 1 
Vanuatu 0.149 0.360 0 1 
Venezuela 0.052 0.222 0 1 
Vietnam 0.233 0.424 0 1 
Yemen 0.410 0.498 0 1 
Zambia 0.024 0.156 0 1 





























Table B2.4:11Pseudo-Panel Summary Statistics, Outages Specifications 
      
 Observations Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
      
Propensity to Bribe 302 0.0837 0.200 0 1 
Monthly Outages 302 5.863 14.23 0 120 
Log(GDP per capita) 302 5.259 2.502 1.143 10.06 
Log(population density) 302 2.372 1.364 0.488 6.113 
Inflation 302 3.795 4.349 0.273 30.55 
Government Indicator Average 302 -0.252 0.379 -1.765 1.215 
Generator Ownership 302 0.229 0.309 0 1 
Internal Working Capital (% of total) 302 39.62 28.57 0 100 
Public Ownership 302 0.0422 0.166 0 1 
Percent Private 302 52.42 30.65 0 100 
Log(annual sales) 302 10.25 5.220 2.187 26.50 






Table B2.5:12Pseudo-Panel Summary Statistics, Commercial Losses Specifications 
      
 Observations Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
      
Propensity to Bribe 239 0.122 0.271 0 1 
Losses (% of total sales) 239 4.962 9.960 0 80 
Log(GDP per capita) 239 6.293 2.538 1.415 10.06 
Log(population density) 239 2.776 1.415 0.511 6.113 
Inflation 239 4.130 4.104 0.299 28.19 
Government Indicator 
Average 
239 -0.266 0.435 -1.326 1.215 
Generator Ownership 239 0.291 0.362 0 1 
Internal Working Capital 
(% of total) 
239 46.62 31.92 0 100 
Public Ownership 239 0.0486 0.186 0 1 
Percent Private 239 61.29 32.14 0 100 
Log(annual sales) 239 12.37 5.452 2.360 26.50 












Table B2.6:13Pooled OLS Instrumental Variables Regression Results – Monthly Power Outages 
           
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Propensity to 
Bribe 
18.13** 19.49*** 15.31** 15.68** 16.64** 14.27** 14.83** 14.79** 15.05** 20.51** 
 (8.461) (7.131) (6.407) (6.416) (7.544) (6.086) (6.623) (6.627) (6.813) (9.294) 
Working Capital 
(% internal) 
 -0.00912 -0.0103 -0.00978 -0.00975 -0.0123 -0.016** -0.016** -0.016** -0.016* 




  0.871* 0.851* 0.800* 1.093* 1.092* 1.094* 1.189* 1.065 
   (0.497) (0.492) (0.441) (0.629) (0.662) (0.662) (0.670) (0.701) 
Public Ownership 
(dummy) 
   1.230 1.172 1.354 1.337 1.336 1.326 1.286 
    (1.556) (1.603) (1.846) (1.854) (1.855) (1.869) (1.941) 
Private 
Ownership (%) 
    -0.00654 -0.00676 -0.00795 -0.00794 -0.00735 -0.00573 
     (0.0100) (0.00945) (0.00999) (0.00999) (0.0100) (0.0105) 
Log (total annual 
sales) 
     -0.181 -0.155 -0.156 -0.163 -0.151 
      (0.166) (0.171) (0.172) (0.173) (0.177) 
Log (GDP per 
capita) 
      -6.546 -4.230 -3.247 -8.223 
       (14.87) (11.97) (11.61) (13.49) 
Log (population 
density) 
       -19.43 -21.88 -16.98 
        (19.36) (18.91) (24.86) 
Inflation         0.0815 0.0376 
         (0.362) (0.465) 
Government 
Indicator Average 
         -5.949* 
          (3.266) 
           
Observations 3,567 2,813 2,504 2,499 2,499 2,234 2,118 2,118 2,106 2,106 
           
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 























Table B2.7:14First Stage Regression Results - Pooled OLS - Monthly Power Outages 
 
Coefficient St. Error p-value 
Working Capital (% internal) 0.000 0.000 0.580 
Generator Ownership 0.034 * 0.018 0.067 
Public 0.009 0.036 0.810 
Percent Private 0.000 0.001 0.437 
Log(total annual sales -0.001 0.004 0.861 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.277 0.508 0.588 
Log(population density) -0.947 0.940 0.318 
Inflation 0.000 0.019 0.993 
Government Indicator Average 0.168 ** 0.078 0.035 
Informal Sector Obstacle 0.019 *** 0.006 0.002 
Quality Certification -0.004 0.020 0.840 
Age of Firm -0.001 *** 0.000 0.007 
Female Ownership 0.000 0.018 0.992 
Percent Foreign 0.000 0.001 0.492 
No. of Observations 2106 
  
F-test of excluded instruments 6.05     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Table B2.8:15Pooled OLS Instrumental Variables Regression Results – Commercial Losses  
Due to Power Outages (% of total sales) 
           
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Propensity to 
Bribe 
14.03* 20.32* 25.16** 26.27** 29.43** 28.90*** 27.83*** 28.06*** 29.03*** 28.29** 
 (8.334) (11.42) (10.50) (10.69) (11.71) (10.04) (10.10) (10.19) (10.64) (12.41) 
Working Capital 
(% internal) 
 -0.0156 -0.020 -0.017 -0.016 -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 




  -2.708*** -2.541*** -2.666*** -1.577* -1.793* -1.801* -1.573* -1.564* 




   4.260 4.239 4.616 4.673 4.653 4.714 4.720 
    (3.004) (2.971) (2.899) (2.877) (2.882) (2.947) (2.957) 
Private 
Ownership (%) 
    -0.0145 -0.0104 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
     (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log (total annual 
sales) 
     -1.017*** -1.045*** -1.040*** -1.040** -1.047** 
      (0.373) (0.394) (0.395) (0.409) (0.409) 
Log (GDP per 
capita) 
      -21.29 -9.429 -2.918 -3.259 
       (49.27) (53.44) (57.10) (57.96) 
Log (population 
density) 
       -113.8 -112.4 -112.0 
        (105.3) (104.9) (104.8) 
Inflation         -0.679 -0.675 




         -0.628 
          (4.773) 
           
Observations 1,638 1,321 1,160 1,156 1,156 1,028 980 980 968 968 
           
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table B2.9:16First Stage Regression Results - Pooled OLS – Commercial Losses as % of Total Sales 
 
Coefficient St. Error p-value 
Working Capital (% internal) 0.000 0.000 0.597 
Generator Ownership 0.007 0.022 0.764 
Public 0.000 0.030 0.992 
Percent Private -0.001 0.001 0.656 
Log(total annual sales 0.000 0.007 0.953 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.693 0.650 0.292 
Log(population density) -0.205 0.902 0.821 
Inflation 0.042 ** 0.019 0.034 
Government Indicator Average 0.237 0.145 0.109 
Informal Sector Obstacle 0.020 *** 0.007 0.006 
Quality Certification 0.010 0.026 0.689 
Age of Firm -0.001 ** 0.001 0.018 
Female Ownership -0.017 0.024 0.476 
Percent Foreign -0.001 0.001 0.664 
No. of Observations 968 
  
F-test of excluded instruments 4.02     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
Table B2.10:17First Stage Regression Results - Pseudo-Panel IV Regressions on Outages 
 
Coefficient St. Error p-value 
Working Capital (% internal) 0.002 0.001 0.074 
Public -0.217 0.130 0.106 
Percent Private -0.011 0.005 0.034 
Generator Ownership 0.357 0.116 0.005 
Log(total sales) -0.036 0.017 0.045 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.153 0.057 0.012 
Log(population density) -0.019 0.040 0.650 
Inflation -0.003 0.029 0.930 
Government Indicator Average -0.146 0.111 0.201 
Informal Sector Obstacle 0.028 0.029 0.352 
Quality Certification 0.053 0.098 0.591 
Age of Firm -0.003 0.003 0.371 
Female Ownership 0.078 0.087 0.379 
Percent Foreign -0.011 0.005 0.029 
No. of Observations 302 
  
F-test of excluded instruments 3.64     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
















Table B2.11:18First Stage Regression Results - Pseudo-Panel IV Regressions on Commercial Losses 
 
Coefficient St. Error p-value 
Working Capital (% internal) 0.002 0.001 0.269 
Public -0.112 0.194 0.572 
Percent Private -0.003 0.008 0.719 
Generator Ownership 0.079 0.151 0.609 
Log(total sales) -0.051 0.021 0.029 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.146 0.091 0.130 
Log(population density) -0.055 0.048 0.267 
Inflation -0.070 0.035 0.062 
Government Indicator Average -0.432 0.122 0.003 
Informal Sector Obstacle 0.041 0.030 0.193 
Quality Certification 0.275** 0.123 0.041 
Age of Firm -0.001 0.004 0.880 
Female Ownership 0.202** 0.088 0.036 
Percent Foreign -0.003 0.008 0.681 
No. of Observations 239 
  
F-test of excluded instruments 3.6     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 













Table B2.12:19Full Dataset Version of Pooled OLS IV Results – Monthly Power Outages 
           
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Propensity to 
Bribe 
18.36** 20.17*** 15.93** 16.29** 17.27** 15.16** 15.77** 15.73** 16.05** 22.01** 
 (8.536) (7.303) (6.538) (6.548) (7.715) (6.295) (6.863) (6.867) (7.071) (9.753) 
Working Capital 
(% internal) 
 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* 




  0.845* 0.826* 0.775* 1.058* 1.053 1.055 1.149* 1.005 
   (0.485) (0.480) (0.432) (0.615) (0.647) (0.647) (0.655) (0.689) 
Public Ownership 
(dummy) 
   1.244 1.182 1.350 1.334 1.332 1.321 1.279 
    (1.569) (1.616) (1.864) (1.874) (1.874) (1.889) (1.973) 
Private Ownership 
(%) 
    -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
     (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log (total annual 
sales) 
     -0.167 -0.139 -0.140 -0.147 -0.136 
      (0.165) (0.170) (0.171) (0.172) (0.178) 
Log (GDP per 
capita) 
      -6.535 -4.341 -3.372 -8.534 
       (15.05) (12.21) (11.90) (14.08) 
Log (population 
density) 
       -18.40 -20.74 -15.38 
        (19.75) (19.26) (25.74) 
Inflation         0.0824 0.0381 
         (0.372) (0.483) 
Government 
Indicator Average 
         -6.104* 
          (3.301) 
           
Observations 3,704 2,899 2,590 2,585 2,585 2,311 2,195 2,195 2,183 2,183 
           
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 










Table B2.13:20Full Dataset Version of Pooled OLS IV Results – Commercial Losses as % of Total Firm Sales 
           
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Propensity to 
Bribe 
15.10* 21.17* 25.88** 26.97** 30.11** 29.92*** 28.93*** 29.16*** 30.32*** 30.40** 
 (8.339) (11.58) (10.66) (10.83) (11.88) (10.18) (10.26) (10.35) (10.81) (13.15) 
Working Capital 
(% internal) 
 -0.015 -0.019 -0.015 -0.0146 -0.0206 -0.0246 -0.0249 -0.0243 -0.0245 




  -2.645*** -2.481*** -2.590*** -1.572* -1.777** -1.785** -1.558* -1.558* 




   4.263 4.263 4.605 4.663 4.642 4.699 4.711 
    (3.016) (2.986) (2.916) (2.893) (2.899) (2.966) (2.990) 
Private 
Ownership (%) 
    -0.012 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
     (0.0159) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Log (total 
annual sales) 
     -0.992*** -1.018*** -1.013*** -1.012** -1.017** 
      (0.368) (0.389) (0.391) (0.405) (0.406) 
Log (GDP per 
capita) 
      -19.86 -7.797 -0.932 -0.705 
       (48.97) (53.22) (56.92) (57.96) 
Log (population 
density) 
       -115.9 -114.3 -113.6 
        (105.1) (104.5) (104.1) 
Inflation         -0.710 -0.748 




         -1.091 
          (5.014) 
           
Observations 1,726 1,390 1,229 1,225 1,225 1,092 1,044 1,044 1,032 1,032 
           
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




















Table B2.14:21IV Pseudo-Panel Grouping Robustness Check 
  Outages Losses 
Propensity to Bribe for a Electricity 
Connection 
45.51 ** 1.87 
  (20.67) (7.39) 
Observations 281 226 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; errors are clustered on country 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Both specifications are instrumented and include firm-level and country-
level controls, as well as cohort and year fixed effects. 
In these regressions, cohorts are grouped based on sector, firm size, and ‘control 









TO BUY OR LEASE? BUSINESS MODEL CONSUMER PREFERENCES IN THE 
SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC MARKET 
 











Third-party ownership (TPO) models can open markets to new consumers since it lowers barriers 
to making capital investments. This paper examines the business model decision between TPO and host-
ownership (HO) in the San Diego County residential solar photovoltaic market from 2010 through Q1 
2013. We focus on consumer preferences as reflected by their stated amount of time spent researching 
different components of the solar adoption process. Using multiple unique and proprietary individual-
level datasets, we show that TPO and HO consumers exhibit heterogeneous preferences. While TPO 
customers seek more information on home modifications required for solar installation, HO customers 
seek more information on financial returns. We also show that higher market saturation is statistically 
associated with a higher likelihood of using a TPO model, but the effect is small. Lastly, plans to retire 
and conversations with other solar owners on home tours were more likely to prompt HO customers in 
their initial interest in solar, whereas future electricity rate increases were more likely to prompt TPO 
customers. Given the importance of understanding consumer preferences for targeting marketing efforts 
and guiding marketing strategies, our results provide valuable guidance for reducing customer acquisition 
costs and accelerating the diffusion of technology in markets where TPO is possible. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
The market for residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems has experienced tremendous growth 
over the past decade, with installed capacity in the U.S. expanding from less than 500 MW in 2008 to 
more than 20 GW in early 2015 (SEIA 2015). Some of this growth can be attributed to steep capital cost 
declines, government financial incentives, reduced technology uncertainty, and market maturation more 
generally. However, some of it also can be attributed to the availability and use of third party ownership 
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(TPO) business models (Drury et al., 2012; Corfee et al., 2014). The TPO model offers customers the 
option to pay a third party owner for using a solar system by either signing a lease or a power purchase 
agreement (PPA) with little or no money down. Now serving as the dominant residential solar PV 
ownership model in the U.S., TPO allows customers to overcome some of the key solar PV adoption 
barriers by reducing or eliminating upfront costs, technology risk, and the installation process complexity 
(Margolis and Zuboy, 2006). On the other hand, host-ownership (HO) requires homeowners to purchase 
solar panels directly, incur technology risk, and bear installation process complexity—though they would 
also enjoy larger financial benefits over the system lifetime. 
As innovative third party financing models such as TPO of technologies or products can open up 
markets to new customer bases and remove barriers to entry (Margolis and Zuboy, 2006), understanding 
how consumer preferences differ between customers seeking TPO and HO can reduce customer 
acquisition costs. This is because customer segmentation and targeted marketing strategies that build upon 
such insights can reduce the amount of time between a customer’s initial interest in solar and actual 
adoption, which reduces the resources that firms must allocate to customer acquisition. Furthermore, 
strategic marketing that employs insights about differences in consumer preferences between the TPO and 
HO markets could accelerate technology diffusion and product adoption more broadly while also 
improving firm competitiveness. 
In this paper, we explore differences between TPO and HO consumer preferences in the 
residential solar PV market. We combine a unique household-level survey dataset including 1,234 solar 
PV adopters and 790 non-adopters from San Diego County, California, covering the years 2007 to 2013, 
with another proprietary dataset of TPO contract prices and terms from 2010 to 2014, to recover 
information about preferences based upon the amount of time TPO and HO customers spend seeking 
information on specific aspects of solar adoption. The successful track record of the TPO model in the 
solar PV market provides an example for future technology and product markets. As such, our study 
provides valuable insights to guide marketing strategies and expedite technology adoption in markets 
where TPO is possible. 
We take a reduced form approach and find that TPO and HO consumers exhibit heterogeneous 
preferences, where each customer type spends different amounts of time searching for information on 
various components of the solar adoption process. More specifically, TPO customers spend more time 
researching required home modifications associated with installing solar while HO customers spend more 
time researching expected financial returns. We interpret this as a reflection of differences in consumer 
preferences across the two groups: TPO customers may place a higher value on reducing hassle related to 
technology adoption since someone else owns the product that will be installed on their property given 
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their focus on researching required home modifications while HO customers may be more concerned with 
long-term investment returns since they face large upfront costs given their focus on financial returns. 
We also estimate the impact of cumulative installations within an adopter’s peer group (defined 
by zip code) on the business model decision and find that higher market saturation (of all adoptions, 
including both TPOs and HOs) is associated with a higher likelihood of using a TPO model, however the 
effect is small. There are at least two potential explanations for this finding. First, this measure could be 
indicative of social interaction (peer) effects, suggesting that peer effects are stronger for TPO customers. 
Second, it could reflect the presence of a specific firm in a region or a stronger level of marketing activity 
within a region by a firm that is either strictly or primarily offering the TPO option. Interestingly, contrary 
to previous work (Drury et al., 2012), we find no demographic differences between the two consumer 
groups, but HO customers are more likely to live in larger homes and face higher utility bills (but the 
effect is small). 
This paper is part of a small literature aiming to understand differences in TPO and HO markets 
in technology adoption. A few papers have explored components of this question in the solar market 
context. However, to our knowledge, no study to date robustly examines differences in consumer 
preferences. For instance, Sigrin et al. (2015) use the same data that we use to observe descriptive 
differences between TPO and HO customers in the motivations for initially adopting solar PV, but 
unexplored questions about the TPO and HO markets remain. Rai and Robinson (2013) compare the 
length of time of the solar adoption decision-making process between TPO and HO customers, but 
information about preferences or market saturation is not addressed. Drury et al. (2012) conduct a 
correlation analysis and find that TPO business models in southern California residential solar PV 
markets have enticed a new demographic to adopt that is highly correlated to younger, less affluent, and 
less educated populations. However, this study does not focus on revealing information about consumer 
preferences or market saturation, and demographics are studied at the zip code level rather than individual 
level. Furthermore, Rai and Sigrin (2013) consider the business model decision in the Texas PV market 
but find that although the TPO model has opened up the market to those with a tight cash-flow situation, 
TPO and HO customers do not differ on socio-demographic variables, which contradicts Drury et al. 
(2012). This study also does not consider differences in consumer preferences or peer effects.  
Our findings also contribute to the growing body of work exploring the demand for solar PV 
more broadly by studying not just the initial decision to adopt solar but the subsequent business model 
decision of how to finance the asset. Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) study peer effects and demonstrate 
an effect of previous nearby adoptions on PV uptake in California. Graziano and Gillingham (2014) 
examine the diffusion of residential solar PV systems using installation data from Connecticut to identify 
spatial patterns of diffusion and clustering of adoptions, finding a strong relationship between adoption 
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and the number of nearby previously installed systems as well as policy variables and the built 
environment. Richter (2013) asks whether installation rates of solar PV are affected by social spillovers 
and finds a small but statistically significant neighbor effect in PV system adoption in the United 
Kingdom. Hughes and Podolefsky (2015) study the impact of subsidies on solar installations, finding that 
the CSI rebate program has had a large effect on adoptions. Lastly, Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2015) 
offer a new approach to estimating demand for solar PV and estimate a price elasticity of demand for 
solar PV. None of these studies explore the business model decision, however.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the TPO business model 
structure and demand for it relative to a HO business model. Section III presents our empirical strategy 
and Section IV describes our data. Section V summarizes our main empirical results, Section VI 
demonstrates that our findings are stable and consistent across a number of robustness checks and 
alternative specifications, and we conclude in Section VII. 
 
3.3 Demand for HO vs. TPO Systems 
Abstracting from the details of market structure and demand to simplify our empirical model, we 
estimate the reduced form relationship between individual characteristics and the decision to use a TPO or 
HO business model. Understanding these relationships sheds light on factors impacting the business 
model decision in technology adoption, as leasing (the TPO option) is a substitute for debt financing (the 
HO option).  
Under a TPO contract, payment structures between the solar customer (homeowner) and the 
system owner (third-party financer or solar integrator) can take the form of either a lease or a power 
purchase agreement (PPA). In leases, customers pay a specified amount every month regardless of energy 
production. In PPAs, customers pay a specified amount per kilowatt-hour (kWh) of generation, so that the 
amount paid varies monthly as a function of generation. Both types of contracts generally range from 15 
to 25 years and may or may not include an annual escalation rate. Customers also have the option of 
making an upfront payment to reduce the contract terms, and often there is the option to prepay the entire 
lease upfront. This translates into a total of four business model options. Three of the options fall within 
the TPO classification (lease, PPA, or prepay), and the last is host-ownership (HO) where the customer 
purchases the system outright. We simplify the consumer choice problem by considering just the decision 
to buy (HO) or lease (TPO) solar PV. Installers often provide homeowners with a menu of contract 
options, varying the parameters that define the terms of the contract and affect its total price (Davidson et 
al., 2015). Homeowners have the opportunity to compare prices of TPO to HO by aggregating payments 
over the duration of the contract and discounting the payments. This is the real contract cost that the 
customer faces, which we define as the net present cost (NPC) of the TPO contract. 
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Consumers’ decisions to buy or lease goods are derived from budget constraints and their 
determinants (income and relative prices) as well as preferences. For example, the leasing option can 
reduce or eliminate upfront costs. Thus, all other factors constant, a consumer with a binding liquidity 
constraint would be more likely to lease, and a consumer with a higher preference for liquidity is more 
likely to prefer leasing because it avoids tying up assets.  
Furthermore, TPO model is often more financially attractive not just because of avoiding high 
upfront costs but also because of the ability of third parties to monetize the federal Investment Tax Credit 
(ITC) for solar and modified accelerated cost recovery system (MACRs) depreciation, which can be 
passed-through to customers in the form of lower PPA or lease contract prices. At the same time, lessees 
must either surrender the assets or purchase the assets at the end of the lease (if this is an option) while 
buyers acquire ownership. The buying option thus builds equity, so consumers aiming to build wealth 
may prefer HO. Classically we expect the HO option to provide larger lifetime benefits. 
Buyers may also just have a strong ownership preference. Individuals make different choices 
even when facing the same budget conditions because each consumer exhibits unique preferences and the 
characteristics of leasing versus buying make each business model preferable to different types of 
customers. For example, the TPO option reduces risks associated with ownership such as uncertain 
operations and maintenance (O&M) costs or technology performance risk because this risk is transferred 
to the third party owner. As such, a consumer who prefers the reduce O&M costs or technology risk may 
prefer to lease.  
 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
To begin, we estimate a probit model for the solar PV business model decision to examine 
differences in information searching between TPO and HO residential customers by the following model: 
 
� �! = 1 �! = �(�! ,�)                                                          (3.1) 
 
Equation 3.1 describes the probability that solar adopter i used a TPO model (�! = 1) for the given 
function F(.) and the vector xi containing measures of how much time adopters spent researching different 
components of the solar adoption decision, as well as several control variables such as socio-
demographic, market, and solar PV system characteristics.  
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Our identification strategy seeks to isolate exogenous variation in information searching.
36
 In all 
of our specifications, we include time fixed effects (year and quarter) to account for common time-
varying unobservables that affect the business model decision. One of the problems with our dataset is 
that TPO is heavily skewed to later years, when the market is more developed. There are a number of 
factors that contribute to this that are a function of time, such as the availability and knowledge of TPO 
models and the general visibility of solar companies offering TPO options. Furthermore, there are a 
number of unobserved factors that could enable trends in information searching of later adopters, 
including the rise of online platforms and partnerships that place solar company representatives in visible 
public spaces. There are also observed factors that vary over time, such as installer concentration and 
market saturation that we control for explicitly along with a number of other variables that might affect 
the business model decision described in Section IV.  
 
3.5 Data 
  We use four datasets in our analysis. First, we obtained unique household-level data from a 
survey conducted by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in conjunction with the Center 
for Sustainable Energy (CSE), which includes 1,234 solar PV adopters and 790 non-adopters in San 
Diego County, California, covering the years 2007 to 2013. The surveys were designed to elicit data 
exploring the factors that drive households to adopt solar PV, including stated motivations (e.g., wanting 
to save money, wanting to stabilize electricity expenditures, etc.), personal attributes (e.g., political 
beliefs, demographics), and information searching. For both surveys, the sampling was limited to 
homeowners. 
Our primary variables of interest about information searching are obtained from this dataset. The 
survey asked respondents how much time they spent researching various components of solar adoption, 
categorizing time on a scale from 0 (no time at all) to 4 (more than one day). We examine information 
search times for six categories: how much power would be generated by the solar system (Time_Power), 
required home modifications (Time_Modifications), equipment (Time_Equipment), required maintenance 
(Time_Maintenance), financial returns (Time_Financial), and whether a good deal was offered 
(Time_Deal). We interpret the amount of time that the adopter spent searching each component as a 
reflection of preferences.   
In addition, we include a number of controls from this survey data. First, we include a dummy for 
adopters who received price quotes for both business model options as opposed to only one of the models 
(quotes). For instance, if an adopter received quotes for HO systems only or TPO systems only, this 
																																																								
36 Our identification strategy assumes that the availability of TPO versus HO at any given point in time is similar, so 
we control for factors such as marketing strategies for the TPO model varying over time and other factors. 	
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dummy takes on a value of zero. This aims to proxy for high information access or high information 
search, controlling for the possibility of firms targeting customers and providing more information that 
might reduce search time as well as the possibility that some consumers just exhibit more searching in 
general. 
We also include nine variables about the types of events or situations that initially motivated 
adopter interest in solar (referred to as “prompts” hereafter). The survey provided respondents with a list 
of potential prompts with the option to check all that applied. We treat each prompt as a dummy that is 
assigned a one if the respondent checked the prompt. Including these variables controls for information 
that could have been provided upfront as the adopter became interested in solar and which may inherently 
bias the adopter towards one business model or the other. At the same time, estimating the model with 
these variables included reveals more information about the types of consumers opting for the TPO or HO 
model. The prompts include: planning a remodeling project (Prompt_Remodel), a recent increase in 
electricity rates (Prompt_ElectRates), thinking about retirement planning (Prompt_Retirement), seeing a 
neighbor install solar (Prompt_SeeNeighbor), talking to a neighbor with solar (Prompt_TalkNeighbor), 
friends or family with solar (Prompt_FriendsFamily), a conversation with a solar homeowner as part of a 
home tour (Prompt_Tour), a conversation with a solar company at a retail store (such as Home Depot or 
Costco) (Prompt_Company), a radio or television advertisement (Prompt_Advertisement), or direct 
marketing by a solar company (salesman visit, mailer, or door hanger) (Prompt_DirectMarketing).  
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the survey responses for our key variables of interest. As 
shown, our sample exhibits variation in each of these measures for TPO and HO customers. Our 




Table A3.1 in Appendix 3A provides summary statistics of all other variables used in the baseline 
specification. We include a number of demographic variables to control for their potential influence on 
the business model decision: household income, education, age, whether the adopter is married, and 
whether the adopter is retired. In the survey, income is measured as an ordinal variable that ranges from 1 
to 10, covering income groups from less than $50,000 to $500,000 or more. Since the income groups do 
not have consistent ranges, we use the midpoint value for each income group. Education reflects the 
highest level of education completed by the solar adopter, included as an ordinal variable ranging from 
less than high school to doctoral or professional degree. Retirement is a dummy variable for whether the 
																																																								
37 We acknowledge that this is a strong assumption. It is possible that these variables are endogenous for various 
reasons such as more information searching being related to having more free time or being part of a two head 
household where only one partner works full-time. However, if this is the case, then we expect the bias to be the 
same for each of the search variables and we are most interested in relative differences across the types of 
information sought rather than absolute magnitudes. 
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Table 3.1:22Descriptive Statistics of Primary Variables of Interest 
  Means   
Standard 
Deviations   Observations   
  TPO HO Difference   TPO HO   TPO HO   
Information Search Variables (from 0=no time at all to 4=more than one day) 
Time researching power generated 1.963 2.078 0.115   1.471 1.485   295 463   
Time researching equipment 1.986 1.852 -0.134   1.402 1.300   293 460   
Time researching home modifications 1.803 1.726 -0.076   1.373 1.306   294 464   
Time researching maintenance 1.784 1.681 -0.103   1.372 1.256   292 461   
Time researching financial returns 2.177 2.207 0.029   1.429 1.397   288 460   
Time researching whether receiving a deal 2.306 2.210 -0.096   1.517 1.475   294 461   
Interest in Solar Prompts (dummies)                     
Remodeling project 0.046 0.113 0.068***   0.209 0.317   328 503   
Electricity rate increases 0.451 0.386 -0.066*   0.498 0.487   328 503   
Retirement planning 0.192 0.288 0.096***   0.395 0.453   328 503   
Seeing a neighbor install solar 0.088 0.103 0.015   0.284 0.305   328 503   
Conversation with a neighbor with solar 0.085 0.121 0.036   0.280 0.327   328 503   
Conversation with friend/family with solar 0.210 0.231 0.020   0.408 0.422   328 503   
Conversation with a solar owner on tour 0.012 0.030 0.018*   0.110 0.170   328 503   
Conversation with solar company at retail 
store 0.067 0.056 -0.011   0.251 0.230   328 503   
Radio or television advertisement 0.143 0.085 -0.058***   0.351 0.280   328 503   
Direct marketing by solar company 0.198 0.167 -0.031   0.399 0.373   328 503   
Note: Asterisks denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.                 
 
adopter is retired, and similarly, being married is measured as a dummy variable. Age is measured as a 
continuous variable. 
Furthermore, it is possible that one’s beliefs about economic issues, politics, or social issues 
impact the business model decision. Perhaps individuals that lean more conservatively or liberally in their 
views have an affinity towards or against one particular method for financing investments or technology 
adoption. We include three survey responses that capture how liberal or conservative the individual is on 
economic, social, and political issues (ranging from 1=very liberal to 7=very conservative, omitting 
respondents who identify as libertarian) to control for this possibility.  
A few house-level characteristics are included to control for level of electricity consumption, 
which impacts the economics (via electricity bill savings) of solar adoption differently between business 
models. Solar adopters save on electricity bills as solar generation offsets electricity load, however the net 
present value of these incurred savings differ between TPO and HO customers depending upon how much 
is paid for the system upfront. We include house built year, summer utility bills (ordinal), home size 
(square footage), whether there is a pool (dummy), and whether there is air conditioning (dummy), all of 
which capture some aspect of electricity load.  
We include four other survey variables in our baseline specification related to individual 
perceptions about the market and solar adoption. First, electricity rate increase expectations 
(ElectRateExpectations) capture how the individual thinks his or her electricity rates will change in the 
next five years. This is an ordinal variable ranging from believing that rates will be about the same in five 
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years to believing that rates will be more than 50 percent higher. The last three control variables from the 
survey reflect factors that might be important in the business model decision if the adopter plans to move 
in the near future. Home buyers with solar must take over leases or PPAs in the case of a TPO and fulfill 
the terms through the end of the contract, and more generally, home buyers typically incur the solar 
system with the house purchase despite the business model employed. Furthermore, there are mixed 
perceptions about the impact of solar on home resale value, which could further complicate the decision-
making process. As such, we include the number of years the homeowner expects to be in the home as 
well as the importance of being able to resell the home and the importance of home value (ranging from 1 
being not important at all to 5 being very important) as controls.  
We obtained interconnection data from California Solar Statistics, which publishes all Investor-
Owned Utility (IOU) solar PV net energy metering (NEM) interconnection data. This data allows us to 
gather information on all interconnected systems in our sample region to calculate installer concentration 
and market saturation, two control variables included in our baseline specification. We measure installer 
concentration by the unique number of installers in the zip code in which an adopter resides active within 
the quarter-year that the adoption decision is made. This aims to control for the availability of the TPO 
model increasing over time, increasing market competition, and the potential of targeted marketing efforts 
at different points in time influencing adopters’ business model decisions. We measure market saturation 
by the cumulative number of solar installations in the zip code in which an adopter resides within the 
quarter-year that the adoption decision is made. This captures the potential influence of social interaction 
(peer) effects and increased marketing over time, as this may be reflective of installers targeting 
marketing efforts, which in turn might be focused on offering one particular business model. 
We match the survey data at the system level to publicly available data from the California Solar 
Initiative (CSI), which reports various dates associated with installation, location, and system 
characteristics. We use the date of the “first new reservation request” as the date of the customer’s 
adoption decision for each installation. Since the actual installation date depends on permitting, 
construction, and installation timing, we consider the reservation request date to be the best 
approximation of the customer’s actual business model decision date. We also include the nameplate 
rating (kW) from this dataset, which controls again for the potential electricity bill savings received from 
installation. Furthermore, we use system characteristics such as size, location, and design (tilt, azimuth, 
tracking type, etc.) to generate year 1 system production estimates through simulation in NREL”s 
PVWatts tool. This helps us to further control for the potential savings incurred from installing solar and 
the expected financial benefits. We include this production estimate as a control as well as production 
multiplied by income. Recent work has shown that the electricity rate structures customers face are 
related to income group because of their tiered design (Borenstein, 2015), and since electricity bill 
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savings incurred from installing solar depends on the rate structure customers face, potential savings is a 
function of production interacted with income.  
Lastly, we include a number of controls for the price of the system and the price of substitutes. 
The primary challenge in doing so is finding an equivalently measured $/Watt price for each business 
model type. The CSI dataset includes a ‘total cost’ measure, which includes parts, labor, fees, etc. This is 
the total cost of the system reported to CSI without incentives and is considered to be a reliable cost 
measure for HO systems. However, for TPO systems, costs are reported differently and inconsistently, 
making direct comparisons to HO systems difficult. Complicating this is the fact that HO customers are 
eligible for directly receiving financial incentives, while TPO customers do not receive these directly but 
rather they are presumably passed on indirectly to some degree in the form of lower priced contracts. 
Therefore, calculating cost measure faced by TPO customers that is comparable to the cost faced by HO 
customers requires information on the actual TPO contract terms.  
One method for doing this is calculating a net present cost (NPC) measure based upon contract 
terms. For leased systems, this requires data on monthly lease payments, contract term, escalation rate, 
and upfront payment. Similarly, for PPAs, this includes data on PPA rate, estimated production, contract 
term, escalation rate, and upfront payment. For TPOs paid in full upfront, this requires data on the upfront 
payment amount.  
The California Public Utilities Commission provided NREL with access to residential TPO 
contracts from 2010 through 2013 through a non-disclosure agreement, which NREL sampled and 
transcribed, with sampling stratified by quarter based on the ‘completed date’ as recorded in the CSI 
database. This resulted in a sample of about 2,500 TPO contracts with usable contract price data. This 
provided us with individual-level TPO contract price parameters such as lease payments, PPA rates, term 
length, escalation rates, and upfront payments. To evaluate contract prices across TPOs with varying 
payment horizons, rates, and escalators in a way that is comparable across TPO structure as well as HO 
systems, we rely on a discounted cash flow methodology. For each contract in our dataset, we aggregate 
all payments faced by the customer over the contract term to assign a net present cost (assuming a 10% 
nominal discount rate in our baseline specification, but varying this assumption through robustness 
checks). We refer to this as the ‘contract price’ or the ‘net present cost’. For leased systems, monthly 
payment amounts and escalation rates allow us to easily find the annual payments over the contract life. 
In the case of PPAs, annual payments are based upon the PPA rate as well as estimated year 1 production 
simulated again in NREL’s PVWatts tool according to system characteristics detailed in the CSI database 
and assuming a 0.5% annual output degradation rate over the contract term (Jordan and Kurtz, 2011). 
Because annual payments for PPAs are based upon estimated production, the NPC of PPAs should be 
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interpreted as an “expected” NPC. For prepaid TPO systems, the net present cost is simply the amount 
paid upfront.  
An additional consideration is the impact of financial incentives on the NPC. Households 
installing solar PV are eligible for several financial incentives. First, the CSI subsidy program awards 
rebates for all residential solar PV owners. These rebate amounts vary over time, across utilities, and in 
their design depending upon the program through which the adopter chooses to participate. However, CSI 
reports the total incentive amount in all cases, providing a comparable incentive amount across adopters 
that can be normalized to system size. In addition, a federal investment tax credit (ITC) provides a 30% 
tax incentive to all solar PV system owners. For HO systems, the homeowner receives these incentives 
directly, but the incentives go to third parties under TPO models and the third party can pass-through the 
incentives (to some unknown degree) in the form of lower contract prices. Lastly, commercial owners are 
eligible for the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS), which is an additional benefit for 
TPO customers.  
Our NPC calculations for TPO systems embed these three incentives in the form of lower 
contract prices. Therefore, it is not necessary to net out the incentive amounts from the net present costs 
of TPO systems, as this would be double-counting the incentives in the price faced by adopters. However, 
we must consider the additional financial incentives for HO customers, since they affect prices faced but 
are not incorporated into the total cost reported in CSI. The CSI rebate for HO systems is simply the total 
incentive amount reported in the CSI database. To calculate the federal ITC, the CSI rebate is considered 
a price reduction for tax credit purposes and thus the 30% ITC applies to the after-rebate net price paid by 
the customer: 
 
���!" = 0.3 ∗ ��!" − ������!"                                                (3.2)4 
 
where ���!" is the federal ITC provided for each HO customer, TC is the total system cost reported in 
CSI, and rebate is the CSI rebate received. The NPC for HO systems is the total cost reported in CSI 
minus both the CSI rebate incentive total and the federal ITC tax credit. This assumes the ability to fully 
monetize the ITC. While the ability to monetize the ITC varies, we do not observe the actual ITC amount 
received.  
Table A3.2 in Appendix 3A provides summary statistics of our NPC calculations across business 
models, which demonstrate the expected patterns. To control for the price of the system adopted and the 
price of substitutes, we found the average NPC ($/watt) in each zip code in the quarter-year of adoption 
for each business model type. This results in the inclusion of four additional control variables: the average 
NPCs for leases, PPAs, prepaid TPOs, and HO systems. This allows us to control for the price of the 
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system as well as the prices of all alternative business model options. Finally, we control for one 
additional cost variable that is not included in the NPC calculation—inverter price. We use the average 
inverter cost ($/watt) in the quarter-year of adoption (Feldman et al., 2015). 
 
3.6 Results 
We begin by presenting our results from our baseline specification for which we estimate a probit 
model for the business model decision (y = 1 if TPO) in Table 3.2, including the controls described in 
Section IV and quarter-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level to allow for 
the possibility of correlations in errors within zip codes. 
Our findings suggest differences between TPO and HO customers in the time spent researching 
different components of solar adoption: TPO customers spend more time researching required home 
modifications associated with solar installation and HO customers spend more time researching financial 
returns from the system. While the coefficient estimates are not directly interpretable, we calculate the 
marginal effects at the mean, which tells us the probability of choosing TPO with a one-unit change in the 
stated time that the consumer researched that component of the solar adoption decision. For instance, if 
the stated time spent researching home modifications increases by one unit (on the ordinal ranking) the 
probability that the adopter chose to use TPO increases by 9.9%. Similarly, a one-unit change in the time 
spent researching financial returns is associated with an 8.6% increase in the probability that the adopter 
chose to use HO. 
We interpret this as reflecting differences in consumer preferences. While TPO customers appear 
to be more concerned with the hassle or additional work required for installing solar, suggesting that they 
place a higher value on the ease of the technology adoption process, HO customers appear to be more 
concerned with financial returns of the investment. Marketers may benefit from providing more targeted 
information about home modifications or financial returns when aiming to acquire customers according to 
one business model or the other. Furthermore, HO customers’ interest in solar is more likely to have been 
prompted by retirement planning (22.2%) and conversations with other solar owners on home tours 
(24.8%), which suggests that marketers may wish to target households that are near retirement age and/or 
increase marketing efforts during solar home tours if they are aiming to attract customers with the HO 
model. On the other hand, TPO customers’ interest in solar is more likely to have been prompted by 
expected electricity rate increases (11%), and thus electricity rate projections may be beneficial marketing 
when aiming to promote the TPO model. 
Lastly, we find that a few other potentially insightful variables are statistically significant, 
however the effects are very small and near zero in some cases. For instance, HO customers tend to live 
in larger homes and face higher utility bills, however the effects are very small. This suggests that it may 
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Table 3.2:23Probit Model Results for Information Searching and Interest in Solar Prompts 
Information Search Variables Estimated Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Time researching power generated -0.141 -0.049 
  (0.095) (0.033) 
Time researching equipment 0.005 0.002 
  (0.143) (0.050) 
Time researching home modifications 0.285** 0.099** 
  (0.116) (0.040) 
Time researching maintenance 0.181 0.063 
  (0.126) (0.043) 
Time researching financial returns -0.249** -0.086** 
  (0.114) (0.039) 
Time researching whether receiving a deal -0.027 -0.009 
  (0.078) (0.027) 
Interest in Solar Prompts (dummies)     
Remodeling project -0.328 -0.104 
  (0.389) (0.110) 
Electricity rate increases 0.316* 0.110* 
  (0.183) (0.064) 
Retirement planning -0.700*** -0.222*** 
  (0.219) (0.062) 
Seeing a neighbor install solar -0.514 -0.157* 
  (0.343) (0.089) 
Conversation with a neighbor with solar 0.236 0.085 
  (0.297) (0.112) 
Conversation with friend/family with solar 0.0158 0.005 
  (0.212) (0.074) 
Conversation with a solar owner on tour -1.009* -0.248*** 
  (0.535) (0.076) 
Conversation with solar company at retail store 0.073 0.026 
  (0.333) (0.119) 
Radio or television advertisement 0.284 0.103 
  (0.265) (0.101) 
Direct marketing by solar company -0.295 -0.097 
  (0.226) (0.069) 
Market Characteristics     
Competition (unique installers per zipcode-Q-Y) -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.013) (0.005) 
Concentration (cumulative installations per zipcode-Q-Y) 0.001 0.0004** 
  (0.001) (0.0002) 
Observations 300   
Wald test (prob >chi2) 610.18   
Log pseudolikelihood -128.20906   
Significance codes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Year by quarter 
fixed effects included. Marginal effects are calculated at the mean. Errors clustered by zip code. Demographic 
controls include (none of which are statistically significant): income ($1,000s), age, education, retired married. 
Electricity cost savings proxies are included as controls (nameplate rating, estimated year 1 production, estimated 
year 1 production * income, house built year, pool, AC) as well as the average inverter cost per watt at the time of 
adoption. We also include other survey variables: electricity rate increase expectations, years to remain in home, 
importance of home value, importance of being able to resell, quotes (dummy), and social, economic, and political 
beliefs (from 1=very liberal to 7=very conservative). 
 
 
be effective to target marketing materials promoting HO to those living in larger homes and those facing 
higher utility bills, on average. Higher market saturation (cumulative solar PV installations in the zip code 
where the adopter is located within the quarter-year at the time of adoption) is associated with a higher 
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likelihood of using a TPO model, however the effect magnitude is small. There are at least two potential 
explanations for this positive effect. First, this could capture peer effects, suggesting that peer effects are 
stronger for TPO customers. Second, it could reflect the presence of a firm that is specifically marketing 
the TPO business model option within a region rather than the HO option (or both options 
simultaneously). 
Interestingly, we find that no demographic variables are statistically significant. The only control 
variables that are statistically significant are inverter costs (associated with a higher likelihood of pursuing 
an HO model), the importance of home value (associated with TPO), and the NPC measures for each of 
the business model types.
38
 This suggests that targeting marketing efforts based upon characteristics such 
as demographics or electricity load when focusing on trying to deploy one business model or the other 
may not be an effective mechanism for increasing adoption using that particular business model. Rather, 
providing information that is particularly sought out by either TPO or HO customers (on home 
modifications for the former and financial returns for the latter) may help to reduce customer acquisition 
costs when the firm is specifically seeking to secure customers using one business model or the other. 
 
3.7 Robustness Checks 
One concern with interpreting our results is that the time spent researching various components of 
the solar adoption decision could be a function of information availability or the ways in which 
individuals research. In other words, it is possible that information about some aspect of the decision is 
more readily available than others. We attempt to control for this with our inclusion of controls on market 
competition (number of unique installers within zip code in the quarter-year of adoption) and whether the 
adopter received quotes for both types of installers (which could either suggest a higher aptitude to search 
more or a greater availability of information). However, it is still possible that information is more 
available from some resources than others. For instance, details about the solar adoption process or the 
technology itself may be more readily available on the Internet than other sources, and vice versa. This 
implies that the ways in which individuals search for information about new products—such as either on 
the Internet, the news, or through conversations with friends—might be related to the type of information 
that they researched for longer periods of time. 
As such, we estimate a model that includes measures capturing the ways in which the customer 
typically learns about new technologies. The survey presented seven ways in which customers might 
learn about new products (advertisements, news, Internet, neighbors, friends or family, coworkers, and 
																																																								
38 Higher inverter costs being associated with a higher likelihood of pursuing HO could be because of higher 
prevalence of micro-inverters among HO or that inverter costs have rapidly declined over our sample period, and 
HO is front-loaded in the data. 
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other) and asked respondents to check all that apply. We include dummy variables for each and show that 
inclusion of these variables does not change the results (see Table 3.3). None of the learning measures are 
statistically significant, and statistical significance does not change for any other controls. 
 
Table 3.3:24Probit Model Results - Including Learning Variable Controls 
Information Search Variables Estimated Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Time researching power generated -0.123 -0.042 
  (0.092) (0.032) 
Time researching equipment 0.009 0.003 
  (0.142) (0.049) 
Time researching home modifications 0.310*** 0.106*** 
  (0.114) (0.039) 
Time researching maintenance 0.153 0.053 
  (0.124) (0.043) 
Time researching financial returns -0.266** -0.092** 
  (0.113) (0.039) 
Time researching whether receiving a deal -0.022 -0.007 
  (0.082) (0.028) 
Interest in Solar Prompts (dummies)     
Remodeling project -0.336 -0.106 
  (0.258) (0.101) 
Electricity rate increases 0.376* 0.130* 
  (0.195) (0.068) 
Retirement planning -0.630*** -0.200*** 
  (0.215) (0.062) 
Seeing a neighbor install solar -0.556 -0.166* 
  (0.357) (0.089) 
Conversation with a neighbor with solar 0.184 0.066 
  (0.311) (0.115) 
Conversation with friend/family with solar 0.066 0.023 
  (0.221) (0.077) 
Conversation with a solar owner on tour -1.030** -0.249*** 
  (0.512) (0.070) 
Conversation with solar company at retail store 0.131 0.047 
  (0.333) (0.121) 
Radio or television advertisement 0.380 0.139 
  (0.288) (0.111) 
Direct marketing by solar company -0.202 -0.067 
  (0.260) (0.083) 
Market Characteristics     
Competition (unique installers per zipcode-Q-Y) -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.004) 
Concentration (cumulative installations per zipcode-Q-Y) 0.001** 0.0004** 
  (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Observations 300   
Wald test (prob >chi2) 3367.13 (0.0000)   
Log pseudolikelihood -125.57613   
Significance codes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Year by 
quarter fixed effects included. Marginal effects are calculated at the mean. Errors clustered by zip code. 
Demographic controls include (none of which are statistically significant): income ($1,000s), age, education, 
retired, married. Electricity cost savings proxies are included as controls (nameplate rating, estimated year 1 
production, estimated year 1 production * income, house built year, pool, AC) as well as the average inverter 
cost per watt at the time of adoption. We also include other survey variables: electricity rate increase 
expectations, years to remain in home, importance of home value, importance of being able to resell, quotes 
(dummy), and social, economic, and political beliefs (from 1=very liberal to 7=very conservative). 
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Second, it is possible that our nominal discount rate assumption of 10% in the NPC calculations 
is poor or inaccurate particularly because each individual is likely to exhibit his or her own preferences 
and implied discount rates and discount rates change over time. We estimated our baseline specification 
with varying discount rates from 5% to 15%, and the results remained identical to our baseline results 
across all specifications, demonstrating that the results are robust to various discount rate assumptions.
39
 
Lastly, our specification potentially suffers from selection bias. It is reasonable to assume that 
there exists interdependency between the business model decision and the original adoption decision 
since the decision to adopt solar PV in the first place may be influenced by the availability and knowledge 
of the TPO model. Essentially, the adoption and business model decisions could be made simultaneously, 
which would cause the error term associated with an equation that only specifies the business model 
decision to be correlated with the variables that explain the adoption decision. If that is true, then the 
business model decision is not exogenous to the adoption decision and estimating the business model 
decision in the presence of selection bias with a standard probit model would be inefficient (relevant 
information is lost).  
We address this by estimating a bivariate probit model with selection, which is a bivariate 
regression model of two probit specifications and independent, identically distributed errors that are 
correlated between the two equations. One probit equation estimates the selection equation (the adoption 
decision) and the other estimates the outcome equation (the business model decision), and thus the 
outcome equation is only partially observed. The final bivariate probit model that we estimate in one step 
by maximum likelihood is written as  
 
��! = �! + X!
!�! + �! + �!                                                           (3.3)5 
�! = �! + X!
!�! + �!                                                               (3.4)6 
 
where Equation 3.3 represents the outcome equation (the business model decision) and Equation 3.4 is the 
selection equation (the adoption decision). In the outcome equation, ��! is the business model decision 
of adopter i where BM equals one for TPOs and zero for HOs and �! are time fixed effects. The matrix ��
! 
contains all other covariates. In the selection equation �! is the adoption decision of individual j where A 
equals one for adopters and zero for non-adopters.  
Our access to survey data on individuals in San Diego County who did not adopt solar that is 
comparable to our adopter survey data enables us to estimate this selection model, however, the variables 
																																																								
39
 We do not include a table of these results because there are no changes to report relative to our baseline 
specification estimates. 
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for which we can include in both equations do not align perfectly. For instance, we do not have 
information searching or interest in solar prompt data for non-adopters, as these would be hypothetical 
questions for non-adopters rather than stated behavior. We also do not have information on solar system 
production for non-adopters since these individuals have not installed solar. Lastly, we cannot include any 
controls in the adoption decision equation that rely upon dates. We calculate a number of control 
variables (such as market concentration, market competition, and NPCs) based upon the quarter-year in 
which adoption occurred, however we do not have dates associated with when non-adopters explicitly 
decided not to adopt. As such, the variables that we are able to include in the adoption decision that are 
comparable across both adopters and non-adopters include income, age, education, being retired, being 
married, house age, house size, importance of home value, importance of being able to resell the one, 
summer utility bills, having a pool, having air conditioning, and electricity rate increase expectations. 
Each of these is measured in the same way for non-adopters as described for adopters.  
Table A3.3 in Appendix 3A presents the results from estimating a bivariate probit model with 
selection that is comparable to our baseline specification (including the same set of controls and using the 
same discount rate assumptions). The findings are stable, suggesting that our univariate probit estimates 
do not suffer from selection bias.  
Interestingly, our results from the selection equation (Table A3.3) show that adopters are more 
likely to have higher utility bills, a pool, and air conditioning. This could be because solar is a more 
attractive option for households with higher electricity loads or because firms target these homes in 
marketing efforts knowing that the value proposition for solar is more attractive. Either way, it provides 
further insights for marketing strategies aiming to accelerate adoption. We also find that adopters expect 
greater increases in electricity rates, demonstrating that they place value on using solar as a hedge against 
future electricity rate increases. On the other hand, non-adopters are more concerned with the importance 
of being able to resell one’s home. This suggests that firms may want to focus efforts on alleviating 
concerns related to the impact of solar on home resale in order to entice this customer segment to adopt. 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
This paper explores how consumer preferences differ between HO and TPO customers in the 
residential solar PV market as revealed through the amount of time they spent researching various 
components of the adoption decision process and other factors. Controlling for factors that impact each 
consumer’s budget constraint (such as income), the price of substitutes, and numerous household-level 
characteristics, our findings suggest that TPO customers appear to be more concerned with factors 
determining adoption hassle, such as the additional home modifications required for solar installation. 
Considering how the TPO option reduces risks associated with ownership such as uncertain operations 
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and maintenance costs and technology performance risk, this finding aligns with the theory in financial 
economics that consumers preferring to reduce such risks may prefer to lease goods. At the same time, we 
find that HO customers are more concerned with factors determining investment returns, such as the 
amount of power that will be generated by the system, which results in electricity bill savings as well as 
direct financial returns. Initially, there is a financial advantage associated with leasing relative to buying 
due to the low upfront costs, however this advantage diminishes over time due to wealth positions at the 
end of the lease or loan terms. Our finding suggests that HO customers may have a stronger preference 
for acquiring wealth and thus ownership of the system. 
Given the importance of understanding consumer preferences in informing marketing strategies, 
our results provide valuable guidance for reducing customer acquisition costs and accelerating the 
diffusion of solar PV. As firms develop more accurate profiles of their potential customers for each 
business model type, they can reduce the amount of time and resources wasted on unlikely customers by 
targeting marketing tactics and information provision accordingly. For instance, our results suggest that 
initial interest in solar was more often prompted by direct marketing and retirement planning for HO 
customers relative to TPO customers, while HO customers also spent more time researching potential 
energy savings and financial returns in their adoption decision process. As such, firms might want to 
consider using direct marketing to provide information about expected power generation and financial 
returns via direct marketing to older homeowners who may be planning for retirement. Similarly, HO 
customers typically face higher utility bills and live in bigger homes relative to TPO customers, so 
targeting information provision on the HO model to homes with such characteristics may be effective. 
Firms seeking to focus on marketing the TPO model might benefit from providing information about the 
required home modifications for solar system installation to potential customers that face lower utility 
bills and live in smaller homes. 
Customer segmentation and targeted marketing strategies such as these could reduce the amount 
of time between a customer’s initial interest in solar and actual adoption, which could reduce customer 
acquisition costs. While the solar market has experienced significant cost improvements over the past 
decade, customer acquisition costs remain substantial. The average price for residential rooftop systems is 
roughly $3.50/W. Nearly 60% of costs are due to on-site labor, permitting, engineering, and other soft 
costs, and while hardware costs are falling, soft costs have actually risen by 6% on average in the past 
year, reflecting the rising expenditures in customer acquisition (SEIA, 2015b). Reducing such costs 
through strategic marketing and customer segmentation can accelerate technology diffusion while also 
improving firm competitiveness. 
While we used the residential solar PV market in San Diego County as our empirical setting for 
exploring differences in preferences for buying or leasing, our findings have broader implications. 
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Innovative third party financing models such as TPO of technologies or products can open markets to 
new customers or expedite technology adoption. Understanding how preferences vary for each of the 
business model types sheds light on the types of consumers that are more or less likely to adopt according 
to one business model or the other. As such, this information provides valuable guidance to marketers 
interested in reducing customer acquisition costs and accelerating technology adoption more broadly, as it 
can inform the type of information that is useful to present to potential customers upfront in order to 
reduce their search time. 
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3.11 Appendix A: Supporting Tables 
Table A3.1:25Descriptive Statistics of Other Variables 
  Means   Standard Deviations   
Observation
s 
  TPO HO Difference   TPO HO   TPO HO 
Market Characteristics                   
Competition  
(unique installers per  
zipcode-Q-Y) 13.20 13.34 0.139   8.892 8.295   328 503 
Concentration  
(cumulative installations per 
zipcode-Q-Y) 276.35 227.732 -48.618***   173.02 158.190   328 503 
Availability of Information                   
Quotes (1 if received price 
quote for both  
business models) 0.235 0.054 -0.181*** 
  
0.424 0.226   328 503 
Electricity Cost Savings 
Proxies       
  
          
Nameplate rating (size in kW) 5.961 5.362 -0.599***   2.627 2.521   328 503 
Estimated year 1 production 
(kWh) 9623.36 8652.89 -970.472***   4349.43 4171.95   328 503 
Year 1 production * income 1324931 1348390 23459   1908179 1789733   187 283 
House size (square footage) 2727.99 2679.91 -48.08   1521.59 1398.41   280 438 
House built year 1981.05 1978.51 -2.544*   18.546 20.844   280 446 
Summer utility bills  
(1 to 7 ordinal) 6.444 6.328 -0.116   2.314 2.521   286 436 
Pool (dummy)  0.420 0.369 -0.051   0.494 0.483   274 445 
Air conditioning (dummy) 0.804 0.774 -0.031   0.397 0.419   271 442 
Market Expectations                   
Electricity rate increase 
expectations (ordinal 1 to 6) 2.788 2.635 -0.153   1.392 1.329   269 417 
Demographics                   
Income ($1,000s) 125.976 142.058 16.082   131.715 134.501   187 283 
Age (years) 58.134 58.378 0.244   10.956 11.963   262 418 
Education (ordinal 1 to 8) 4.829 5.109 0.280**   1.360 1.414   246 394 
Retired (dummy) 0.392 0.413 0.021   0.489 0.493   268 426 
Married (dummy) 0.852 0.893 0.041   0.356 0.309   270 421 
Social issue beliefs  
(1=very liberal to 7=very 
conservative) 3.967 3.780 -0.187   2.032 1.920   245 373 
Economic issue beliefs 
(1=very liberal to 7=very 
conservative) 4.964 4.885 -0.079   1.813 1.714   250 374 
Political issue beliefs  
(1=very liberal to 7=very 
conservative) 4.577 4.393 -0.184   2.053 1.939   253 379 
Value of Home                   
Expected years to remain in 
home 21.482 21.998 0.516   14.100 13.343   272 437 
Importance of home value  
(1 to 5) 3.136 3.200 0.064   1.325 1.248   294 466 
Importance of being able to 
resell (1 to 5) 2.471 2.471 0   1.389 1.317   289 456 
Other                   
Inverter cost ($/watt)  
(average at time of adoption) 0.354 0.405 0.051***   0.053 0.073   328 503 
Note: Asterisks denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  












Table A3.2:26Net Present Costs ($/watt) by Business Model  
  5% Nominal Discount Rate 
  Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Leases $5.10 $0.52 $3.95 $5.87 
PPAs $5.14 $0.58 $3.89 $5.83 
Prepaid $4.19 $0.62 $3.36 $5.44 
Purchased $4.11 $0.39 $3.28 $4.54 
  10% Nominal Discount Rate 
  Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Leases $3.56 $0.24 $3.07 $3.88 
PPAs $3.63 $0.38 $2.89 $4.10 
Prepaid $3.40 $0.32 $3.05 $4.04 
Purchased $4.11 $0.39 $3.28 $4.54 
  15% Nominal Discount Rate 
  Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Leases $2.73 $0.12 $2.54 $2.91 
PPAs $2.81 $0.29 $2.30 $3.23 
Prepaid $2.97 $0.19 $2.63 $3.29 













Table A3.3:27Bivariate Probit with Selection 
  Outcome Equation (TPO = 1) 
Selection Equation  




Marginal Effect Estimated Coefficient 
Information Search Variables       
Time researching power generated -0.117 -0.027   
 
(0.094) (0.021)   
Time researching equipment 0.024 0.005   
 
(0.126) (0.029)   
Time researching home modifications 0.251** 0.058**   
 
(0.104) (0.024)   
Time researching maintenance 0.159 0.036   
 
(0.118) (0.027)   
Time researching financial returns -0.242** -0.055**   
 
(0.102) (0.023)   
Time researching whether receiving a deal -0.022 -0.005   
 
(0.073) (0.017)   
Interest in Solar Prompts (dummies)       
Remodeling project -0.302 -0.069   
 
(0.357) (0.081)   
Electricity rate increases 0.299* 0.068*   
 
(0.164) (0.037)   
Retirement planning -0.620*** -0.142***   
 
(0.189) (0.042)   
Seeing a neighbor install solar -0.512 -0.117*   
 
(0.311) (0.071)   
Conversation with a neighbor with solar 0.268 0.061   
 
(0.258) (0.060)   
Conversation with friend/family with solar 0.013 0.003   
 
(0.195) (0.045)   
Conversation with a solar owner on tour -0.900* -0.206*   
 (0.513) (0.117)   
Conversation with solar company at retail store 0.064 0.015   
 
(0.296) (0.068)   
Radio or television advertisement 0.258 0.059   
 
(0.245) (0.056)   
Direct marketing by solar company -0.226 -0.052   
 
(0.199) (0.046)   
Market Characteristics       
Competition  
(unique installers per zipcode-Q-Y) -0.002 -0.0004   
 
(0.012) (0.003)   
Concentration  
(cumulative installations per zipcode-Q-Y) 0.001** 0.0002**   
 (0.0005) (0.0001)   
 
Variables Included in Both Equations       
Income ($1,000s) -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 
 
(0.002) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Age (years) -0.003 -0.0006 0.002 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.006) 
Education (ordinal) -0.022 -0.005 -0.043 
 
(0.073) (0.017) (0.041) 
Retired (=1 if retired) 0.082 0.019 -0.106 
 
(0.172) (0.039) (0.130) 
Married (=1 if married) -0.234 -0.054 0.086 
 
(0.236) (0.054) (0.117) 
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Table A3.3: continued 
House built year 0.003 0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.003) 
Importance of home value (ordinal) 0.216* 0.049* 0.087 
 
(0.115) (0.026) (0.072) 
Importance of reselling home (ordinal) -0.293** -0.067** -0.654*** 
 
(0.140) (0.031) (0.069) 
Summer utility bills (ordinal) (average) -0.034 -0.008 0.241*** 
 
(0.054) (0.012) (0.030) 
Size of home (square footage) -0.0002* -0.00004* 0.000 
 
(0.0001) (0.00002) 0.000 
Pool (=1 if yes) 0.403** 0.092** 0.296** 
 
(0.180) (0.041) (0.127) 
Air conditioning (=1 if yes) 0.218 0.050 0.233* 
 
(0.223) (0.051) (0.124) 
Electricity rate increase expectations (ordinal) 0.020 0.005 0.183*** 
 
(0.070) (0.016) (0.046) 
Observations 758 (455 censored) 
Wald test (prob >chi2) 
8829.07 
(0.0000) 
    
Log pseudolikelihood -441.0068     
Significance codes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. Year by 
quarter fixed effects included. Marginal effects are calculated at the mean. Errors clustered by zip code. Other 
controls in the outcome equation include nameplate rating, inverter cost at time of adoption, Y1 production 
estimate, Y1 production estimate * income, the price of substitutes (NPCs of other business models), how many 
years the individual expected to remain in the home, quotes (dummy), and social, economic, and political 








WHAT IMPACTS SOLAR SUBSIDY INCIDENCE? 
 











Whether solar subsidies benefit consumers is an open question. In the U.S. residential solar 
market, consumers can either purchase systems and receive subsidies directly (host ownership (HO)) or 
opt into a third party ownership (TPO) agreement. For the case of TPO, subsidies go to the third party 
owner of the system, however the third party can pass through subsidies in the form of lower contract 
prices. Using a unique setting of large drops in subsidy levels, we estimate solar subsidy pass-through 
allowing for heterogeneous effects between TPO and HO. We find that HO consumers capture about 88% 
of subsidies while TPO customers capture up to 160%. This is surprising because standard economic 
theory predicts that the relative benefit of a subsidy does not depend on who actually receives it. Future 
work will explore what explains the remarkably high pass-through to TPOs and why pass-through differs 
based upon who receives the subsidy. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
The market for residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in the United States has grown 
exponentially over the past decade, playing an increasingly important role in the energy policy dialogue. 
Some of this growth can be attributed to widely adopted government incentives.
43
 Although there is 
agreement that the best policy for reducing negative externalities from energy use is to implement a tax or 
cap-and-trade program, many governments subsidize cleaner alternatives to traditional fossil fuel-based 
technologies instead of pricing negative externalities associated with energy use.  
 Whether solar subsidies benefit solar customers is an open question. There are no studies that 
estimate how solar subsidy pass-through differs based on the use of third party ownership (TPO) as 
opposed to host-ownership (HO) under which consumers purchase the system directly, yet such business 
																																																								
40 Assistant Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
41 Primary researcher and author; Ph.D. Candidate, Division of Economics & Business, Colorado School of Mines 
42 Assistant Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 
43 Other variables contributing to market growth include steep capital cost declines, reduced technology uncertainty, 
and the availability and use of third party ownership (TPO) business models.	
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models have become the dominant form of residential solar contracts. Figure 4.1 illustrates the weekly 
number of installations over time by business model, demonstrating how the TPO model now dominates 
the residential solar PV market in California. Under the TPO model, customers sign a lease or a power 
purchase agreement (PPA) with little or no money down, and a third party owns the system. Third party 
owners receive the incentives and can pass them to the customer in the form of lower monthly lease 
payments or lower PPA rates. On the other hand, in the case of HO, the solar customer receives the 
incentive directly.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Trend in Weekly Installations of Solar Panels by Business Model in California, 2010-Q2 2013 
	
This paper aims to answer two questions. First, what proportion of solar subsidies is passed-
through to system prices? Second, do pass-through rates differ between HO and TPO markets? Standard 
economic theory predicts that the relative benefit of a subsidy is independent of who actually receives the 
subsidy. In other words, incidence does not depend upon whether a subsidy is directed to the buyer or the 
seller. We ask whether this familiar invariance result holds in the residential solar PV market in which 
subsidies are either directed to buyers (in the case of HO) or to sellers (in the case of TPOs).  Although 
third parties own the system in the case of TPO, we interpret third parties to be sellers because they lease 
systems to consumers. Incidence might differ across these two business models for a variety of reasons, 
including consumer selection and differences in the competitiveness of HO versus TPO markets.   
To answer these questions, we estimate the effect of solar subsidies ($/Watt) on post-incentive 
solar PV system prices ($/Watt) allowing for heterogeneous effects between HO and TPO consumers. We 
use a unique setting and rich data from California, where about half of all U.S. residential solar PV 
systems are located (Borenstein, 2015). We study the largest state rebate program in the United States so 
far—the California Solar Initiative (CSI)—and focus on the expected Performance Based Buydown 
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(EPBB) program. This program awards rebates based upon expected solar PV system generation capacity 
to residential and commercial consumers. The rebate level depends on when the consumer installs the 
system as rates decline in a step-like function. Rebate level drop dates are determined by cumulative 
installed capacity of solar megawatts (MW) with confirmed project reservations within each Investor 
Owned Utility (IOU) service territory. This design presents variation across time as well as across IOU 
territory and allows us to use large jumps in rebate levels to identify the causal impact of a change in 
subsidy level on post-incentive price, assuming that all other price trends are smooth. The subsidy is a 
one-time, lump-sum upfront payment at the time of installation. While payments are directed to the owner 
of the solar system, the ultimate benefit of the subsidy to the consumer depends on the price of the system 
that is paid by consumers. 
We collect system-level data from the CSI, which include the amount of rebate received and the 
reported total cost of the system. For TPOs, however, the reported cost is known to be unreliable as third 
party companies have an incentive to over-report costs to increase the value of a federal investment tax 
credit as well as the benefits received from the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) 
for solar systems (Podolefsky 2013). There are also numerous inconsistencies in what third parties 
include in their measure of total cost. On the other hand, the price faced by TPO customers may be more 
accurately reflected by the contract terms agreed upon between the third party and customer, and 
subsidies are passed-through to consumers (to some unknown degree) in the form of lower contract 
prices. We therefore collected and transcribed a unique and proprietary dataset containing individual TPO 
contracts in California through a non-disclosure agreement and construct a contract price variable for 
TPOs that is comparable to HO reported costs by calculating the net present cost of TPO systems based 
upon actual contract terms agreed upon between the installer and consumer. 
  We find that subsidy pass-through is much higher for TPOs than it is for HOs. Our results show 
that HO consumers capture about 88 percent of every dollar, while TPO consumers capture about 160 
percent of every dollar. We include a rich set of fixed effects and controls and conduct several robustness 
checks to demonstrate that our estimates are not affected by time trend flexibility or discount rate 
assumptions. While we find that pass-through for TPOs is remarkably high, such findings that exceed 
unity are not unique. There are conditions related to market structure and curvature of demand that can 
theoretically explain greater than 100 percent pass-through; other empirical examples include Barzel 
(1976) and Kenkel (2005). 
Our paper is the first to our knowledge that studies how solar subsidy pass-through differs for 
TPO and HO consumers. A growing literature examines the effectiveness and efficiency of solar 
subsidies, but the distributional effects have not been as widely studied. For instance, Hughes and 
Podolefsky (2015) examine the CSI program and find that upfront rebates have a large effect on 
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residential solar installations. Burr (2013) also uses CSI data to show the impact of subsidies on the 
decision to adopt solar. Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) examine peer effects in the residential solar PV 
market using the CSI data, and Graziano and Gillingham (2014), Richter (2013), and Müller and Rode 
(2013) study peer effects as a determinant of solar PV adoption in other locations. Using a theoretical 
framework, van Benthem, Gillingham, and Sweeney (2008) provide the case under which it is optimal for 
a solar subsidy to exist and apply their learning-by-doing framework to the CSI. However, these papers 
do not address who benefits from solar subsidies. 
Furthermore, past studies specifically examining solar subsidy pass-through have been unable to 
compare incidence between HO and TPO business models because of the lack of reliable TPO pricing 
data. Podolefsky (2013) studies federal incentive pass-through in California but only for host-owned solar 
systems. Dong et al. (2014) estimate the pass-through rate for HO systems as well as pass-through to third 
party leasing companies, but they do not estimate pass-through to the actual customer in the case of TPO. 
Estimates vary widely, ranging from 17% in Podolefsky (2013) to nearly 100% in Dong et al. (2014).  
More generally, subsidies for other green technologies have been widely studied as well. Sallee 
(2011) shows that tax credits on the hybrid vehicle Toyota Prius are almost entirely passed through to 
consumers. Diamond (2009), Chandra, Gulati and Kandlikar (2010), and Gallagher and Muehlegger 
(2011) estimate the effect of state incentives for hybrids on sales. Beresteanu and Li (2011) use a 
structural approach to estimate incidence and the effect of incentives on sales for hybrid vehicles. Lastly, 
perhaps most similar to ours given the differentiation between who receives the subsidy, Busse, Silva-
Risso and Zettelmeyer (2006) examine cash incentives for automobile manufacturers and show how pass-
through varies based upon whether the incentive is directed to the customer or dealer. The authors argue 
that information asymmetries can explain this difference. 
 Our main contribution is the estimation of solar subsidy pass-through while allowing for 
heterogeneous effects between HO and TPO. Other studies of green technology subsidy incidence do not 
differentiate pass-through for third party market consumers. Furthermore, despite TPO becoming the 
dominant model in the residential solar PV market, other studies specifically examining solar subsidies 
have been unable to estimate pass-through in the TPO market because of data limitations. We overcome 
the barrier of unreliable reported costs for TPOs by using proprietary contract data and show that the 
familiar neoclassical result of invariance does not hold in the California residential solar PV market. 
Surprisingly, the pass-through rate for TPOs for which subsidies are directed to the ‘seller’ is much higher 
on average than it is for HOs for which subsidies are directed to the ‘buyer’.  
This research is also relevant for today’s policymakers since estimating pass-through for solar 
subsidies demonstrates how benefits accrue in different parts of the solar market. This is important in the 
context of understanding the redistribution of revenue. Furthermore, our findings suggest that a higher 
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proportion of solar subsidies are transferred to TPO consumers relative to HO consumers, counter to the 
common public perception that third party companies are using deceptive tactics to scam customers on 
the use of incentives. In the near future, we plan to investigate why pass-through for TPO customers is so 
high and which factors can likely explain the difference in pass-through between the HO and TPO 
markets.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we describe our empirical strategy and relevant 
estimation issues. In Section III we present the data. In Section IV we estimate the pass-through rates for 
HOs and TPOs. We provide a discussion and conclude in Section V. 
 
4.3 Empirical strategy  
In an ideal experiment examining solar subsidy incidence, one would consider rebates given by 
similar installers and prices faced by similar consumers for solar PV systems that are identical in terms of 
system characteristics (size, performance, solar output, design, etc.) and then randomly increase or 
decrease the rebate level for one group while keeping it fixed for the other. We are not aware of any solar 
subsidies that have been implemented in this way. However, there exists a natural experiment that allows 
us to identify heterogeneous effects with some additional assumptions.  
 
4.3.1 Quasi-experiment design 
Policymakers and regulators around the world seek to reduce demand for fossil energy by 
promoting substitution towards cleaner renewable energy sources such as solar. Although policy support 
for renewables is second-best policy when there does not exist pollution pricing, government incentives 
have played a significant role in the U.S. residential solar market. At least 21 states currently offer rebates 
for renewable energy generation, lowering the upfront cost of solar that consumers face.
44
  
 We focus on the largest state rebate program for solar to date, the California Public Utilities 
Commission’s (CPUC) California Solar Initiative, which took effect starting January 1, 2007 with a 10-
year planned budget of $2.167 billion. The CSI covered three major Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) 
within California: San Diego Gas and Electric (SDGE), Southern California Edison (SCE), and Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). Consumers had the option of choosing to receive rebates as upfront 
payments under the Expected Performance Based Buydown program (EPBB) or as a Performance Based 
Incentive (PBI). We study the EPBB program, which provides one-time payments to solar system owners. 
The rebate level is determined by the date of the CSI rebate application. Incentive amounts “stepped 
down” over ten pre-determined rebate levels based upon cumulative installed capacity in each IOU 
service region, declining from $2.50 per watt to $0.20 per watt over the program lifetime. This provides 
																																																								
44 This is according to the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE) as of March 12, 2016. 
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The CSI rebate program introduced large drops in the per kilowatt value of subsidy that occurred 
at different times across IOUs in California. This design lends itself naturally to an identification strategy 
that uses regression discontinuity. However, the dates of the rebate level changes were transparent to 
consumers, which induced a timing response among consumers as they moved their CSI rebate 
reservation timing into more favorable rebate level windows. Although the rebate level drop dates were 
not explicitly pre-determined but rather dependent upon cumulative installed capacity within each IOU, 
CSI announced on a public website how many CSI megawatts (MW) worth of rebates remained in the 
current incentive step level. This web-based CSI Trigger Tracker allowed users to anticipate when the 
rebates were going to drop to the next level by comparing “MW Under Review” with “MW Remaining”. 
The rebate level is determined at the time of the reservation, not the time of project completion, so it was 
relatively easy to strategically submit reservations to an IOU as each IOU approached step capacity 
targets. 
 Figure A4.1 in Appendix 4A illustrates the large spikes in CSI rebate reservations just prior to 
rebate level changes for each IOU. Rogers and Sexton (2014) empirically demonstrate this “bunching”. 
The endogeneity on rebate level assignment around steps is problematic for a regression discontinuity 
approach around the rebate level steps. A comparison of prices just before and after rebate level changes 
will give a biased estimate of subsidy incidence if consumers who strategically submit reservation 
requests differ systematically from those who do not. Consumers who act strategically could differ in a 
number of ways, such as being more price elastic or better informed.  
 Since this “bunching” behavior invalidates a regression discontinuity approach, we estimate the 
impact of solar subsidies on prices over a longer time horizon and assume that the mix of consumers is 
the same on average. Our identification strategy uses large drops in rebate levels relative to smooth price 
trends. This strategy assumes that all other price trends over time are smooth.
45
 We also include a rich set 
of fixed effects and controls. Figure 4.2 illustrates the CSI rebate level over time and across utilities from 
2010 through Q2 2013.
46
 Note that the rebate steps change at different times for each IOU. This is the 
main source of variation that we exploit. 
																																																								
45 We show that our findings are not sensitive to the flexibility of time trend included. 
46 The steps are not perfectly flat for two reasons. First, we normalized the total rebate received by nameplate rating, 
and in some cases, rebates were weighted between two steps depending on reservation timing.	Second,	our	measure 
of CSI rebate in dollars per watt is normalized based upon nameplate rating. The rebate was actually determined by 




Figure 4.2: Variation in CSI Rebate ($/Watt) Across IOUs and Over Time 
 
Lastly, another identification concern relates to local treatment effects. Although we cannot be 
certain that the estimated impact of solar subsidy changes on prices is representative for other subsidies, 
this local treatment effect is particularly interesting because there is public concern about whether third 





 The purpose of this section is to describe the various data sources that we compiled in order to 
conduct the analysis as well as other variables that we derived based upon this data. We first describe the 
California Solar Initiative data, which was gathered from a public database containing system-level 
characteristics and location information. Next, we describe the proprietary TPO contract data that we 
obtained through a non-disclosure agreement and explain our derivation of a post-incentive price variable 
for TPO systems as well as our adjustment of rebates based upon other incentives available at the time of 
adoption. 
 
4.4.1 California Solar Initiative Data 
We employ public installation data from the CSI.
48
  These data include various project milestone 
dates as well as system-level installation characteristics such as system size, performance rating, location 
of the solar installation, module type, installer name, rebate rate, total cost, and incentive payment. We 
																																																								
47 For instance, see this December 19, 2014 article here: http://watchdogwire.com/california/2014/12/19/how-solar-
leases-scam-the-homeowner-and-solar-contractors-keep-the-subsidies/.		
48 We use the “Working Data Set” file posted on June 24, 2015.  
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include only residential systems under the EPBB program. We also only include those with CSI rebate 
applications that are either “completed” or “pending”. We use the date of the “first reservation request 
review” as the date for each project, which reflects when a contract is first established with CSI. This is 
the date that determines the CSI rebate rate reserved by the consumer, and like Hughes and Podolefsky 
(2015), we view this as the best approximation of the customer’s decision date. Lastly, the CSI database 
includes the actual rebate rate(s) that were applied to each system as well as the total incentive amount 
awarded. In some cases, the total rebate amounts are constructed as weighted averages of two steps, 
presumably because of the timing of the rebate application occurring around a rebate change date. Since 
we are interested in estimating the amount of the incentive actually awarded that is passed-through to 
prices, we use the total incentive amount awarded and derive an average dollars per watt incentive 
amount based upon the size of the system (nameplate rating (kW)).  
The total subsidy awarded is determined by the rebate rate that existed at the time the customer 
made a reservation through their IOU as well as the system and geographical characteristics that 
determine expected system performance. The process generally proceeds as follows.
49
 First, customers 
plan a solar installation with a contractor or installer, who then sends a reservation to the IOU. The 
reservation includes system characteristics that determine system performance, such as module type, 
inverter type, system size, installation location, site shading, system orientation, etc. These characteristics 
determine the system’s “Design Factor”, or the expected electrical output of the solar PV system relative 
to a reference system. The “Design Factor” is multiplied by the rebate rate that exists at the time that the 
reservation is made to find the total subsidy amount for a system. This amount is reported back to the 
customer, and once the system is installed and connected to the grid, the solar system owner receives a 
check for the total subsidy amount. 
A few other steps were taken to prepare the CSI data, which are described in Appendix C.  We 
begin our sample in 2010 given the TPO contract data available to us (detailed in the next section) and we 
cut our sample at the end of Q2 2013 because this is when the CSI program concluded. 
 
4.4.2 System Prices 
The effective price to a consumer depends on not only the transaction price but also incentives. 
Contractors may negotiate higher transaction prices if they know the consumer will receive a rebate. 
Similarly, for TPOs, contractors may negotiate contract terms based upon the rebate it will receive and 
presumably pass-through to some degree to consumers in the form of lower contract terms.  
The measure of price used in this paper, the post-incentive price, is the transaction price inclusive 
of cash rebates and other incentives and exclusive of taxes. Our primary challenge is in obtaining an 
																																																								
49 We obtained these process details from Rogers and Sexton (2014). 
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equivalently measured $/Watt post-incentive price for TPOs and HOs. The CSI dataset includes total 
reported cost without incentives. This is considered to be a reliable measure for HO systems, so the post-
incentive price for HOs is simply the reported total cost minus the CSI incentive amount as well as other 
incentives. There was at least one other incentive available to HO customers during our sample period: 
the federal investment tax credit (ITC). The federal ITC provides a 30% tax incentive to all solar PV 
system owners. We do not observe the actual ITC for each consumer, but we can derive the implied ITC 
by assuming that it is fully monetized.
50
 The CSI rebate is considered a price reduction for tax credit 
purposes for HOs. Thus, the 30% ITC applies to the after-rebate net price paid by the customer, calculated 
as: 
 
���!" = 0.3 ∗ (��!" − ���!")                                                   (4.1)7 
 
where ITCHO is the federal ITC received by each HO customer, TCHO is the total system cost reported in 
CSI, and CSIHO is the total CSI rebate amount received.  
 On the other hand, the total costs in the CSI database for TPO systems are reported inconsistently, 
which Podolefsky (2013) demonstrates. Therefore, finding a post-incentive price faced by TPO 
consumers requires information on the actual TPO contract terms agreed upon between TPO customers 
and third parties. One method for deriving this is to calculate the net present cost (NPC) based upon 
actual contract terms. This requires data on monthly lease payments or power purchase agreement (PPA) 
rates, estimated solar production (for PPAs), contract term length, upfront payments, and whether an 
escalation rate was applied to annual terms. 
 The California Public Utilities Commission provided the National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(NREL) with access to residential TPO contracts from 2010 through 2014 through a non-disclosure 
agreement, which NREL sampled and transcribed following a stratified sampling strategy. We use this 
data and a discounted cash flow methodology to calculate the NPC of each contract, assuming a 10% 
nominal discount rate and 3% inflation in our baseline specifications, as follows: 
 





                                                            (4.2)8 
 
																																																								
50 It is possible that the cost of the system reported to the CSI is not the cost reported on tax forms. Furthermore, the 
credit is non-refundable and cannot be carried forward beyond 2016. As such, the customer must have enough tax 
liability to absorb the credit, so our calculation follows Borenstein (2015) and assumes that the ITC is fully 
monetized. This likely overstates its value but we cannot say by how much (Borenstein 2015). 
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where ���! is the NPC for system i, Ui is the upfront payment, annuali is the total annual payment, d is 
the assumed real discount rate, and t is the number of years of the contract term. For leases, annual 
payments are derived from the prescribed monthly payment amounts and escalation rates. For PPAs, 
annual payments are calculated based upon the PPA rate as well as estimated year one production and 
assuming a 0.5% annual output degradation rate over the contract term (Jordan and Kurtz, 2012).
51
 For 
prepaid TPOs, the NPC is simply the amount paid upfront. 
 Like HO customers, third party owners of solar PV systems in our sample were eligible for the 
CSI rebate and the federal ITC as well as Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) 
benefits. The NPC calculations embed these incentives (to some unknown degree). 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the CSI rebate amounts and NPCs in our sample from 
2010 through Q2 2013, which reflect the expected patterns. Note that we refer to the post-incentive prices 
for HOs as NPCs as well. On average, the NPC for TPOs is $3.46 per watt compared to $4.13 per watt for 
HOs. The CSI rebate is also lower for TPOs on average. Additional descriptive statistics of TPO contract 
terms and NPCs by contract type can be found in Appendix Table B4.1 of Appendix 4B. 
 
Table 4.1:28Descriptive Statistics of Final Sample, 2010-Q2 2013 
  Means   Standard Deviations   Observations   
 





   (1) (2) (3)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   





















           




Figure 4.3 illustrates how TPO and HO NPCs follow different time trends relative to the CSI 
rebate and converge towards the end of the CSI program. This motivates our question of whether pass-







Figure 4.3: Net Present Cost ($/Watt) Trends for TPO vs. HO Relative to CSI Rebate 
 
4.4.3 Adjusting the CSI Rebate 
The availability of the federal ITC and MACRS benefits to households installing solar PV during 
our sample period complicate an analysis of CSI rebate pass-through because of their interactions, as 
follows. 
 For HOs, the CSI rebate is a price reduction for tax credit purposes, so the 30% federal ITC 
applies to the after-rebate net price paid by the customer as shown in Equation 4.1. On the other hand, for 
TPOs, the state rebate is taxable income. Therefore, the basis for the 30% credit is not reduced by the 
rebate amount. The federal ITC for third parties is based on gross installed cost. While this may seem as 
though it translates into a higher incentive for third parties, firms also face corporate taxes and the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considers the CSI rebate to be earned income. This offsets the ITC benefit 
for third parties. As such, the ITC for third parties can be calculated as: 
 
���!"# = 0.3 ∗ ��!"# − � ∗ ���!"#                                             (4.3)9 
 
where ���!"# is the net federal ITC received by third parties after considering a corporate tax rate of t on 
the CSI rebate (CSI) and the total reported cost (TC). This is equivalent to the ITC for HOs if the firm 
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faces a 30% marginal tax rate. We do not observe each firm’s marginal corporate tax rate, so we follow 
Borenstein (2015) and assume a 30% marginal tax rate for simplicity.
52
  
 The implied value of accelerated depreciation benefits available to TPOs can be calculated also. 
When individual homeowners purchase solar PV systems, the owner is not subject to tax on the output of 
the system so the owner is not able to take a tax deduction for depreciation. However, when a third party 
owns the system, the income that the third party earns from leasing the system or selling energy under a 
PPA is taxable and the company can claim a tax deduction for depreciation of the system. 
 Over our entire sample period, residential solar PV systems were eligible for 5-year accelerated 
depreciation as well as first-year “bonus” depreciation. For systems placed into service after September 8, 
2010 and before January 1, 2012, first-year bonus was 100 percent depreciation; it was 50 percent during 
the other dates in our sample.
53
 Typically, the depreciation basis is the net cost (after incentives). 
However, depreciation for solar PV systems differs slightly as firms are allowed to depreciate 85 percent 
of the system cost (after state rebates) as opposed to the 70 percent that they actually had to pay following 
the federal ITC. Thus,  
 
� = 0.85 ∗ (�� − ���)                                                              	(4.4)10 
 
where D is the depreciation basis, TC is the total reported system cost, and CSI is the CSI incentive 
amount awarded. The amount that is actually saved on taxes through the depreciation is a function of the 






∗ � ∗ �
!
!!!                                                          	(4.5)11 
 
where m is the MACRS recovery rate in year y, r is the firm’s discount rate, t is the firm’s marginal tax 
rate, and D is the aforementioned depreciable basis.
54
 We find the net present value of the tax savings 
																																																								
52 The marginal corporate tax rate for firms of a relatively small size was 35% over the years of our sample period 
was 35%, so the discrepancy likely is not substantial.   
53 Under 50 percent first-year bonus depreciation, the depreciation schedule was 60%, 32%, 19.2%, 11.52%, and 
5.76% for years one through six, respectively. Under 100 percent first-year bonus depreciation, the system was fully 
depreciated in year one. 
54 We follow Borenstein (2015) and assume a 35 percent marginal tax rate for the MACRS calculation, which is the 
corporate tax rate for firms of significant size. Our discount rate and inflation assumptions match those of our NPC 
calculations.	
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from depreciation of the system as a percentage of the full cost of the system, after incentives, and call 
this MACRS%. 
 Each of these incentives cannot be separately identified in a regression model because they are 
functions of each other. As such, the interaction between these incentives and the CSI rebate requires an 
adjustment of the CSI rebate amount prior to estimating CSI rebate pass-through. For instance, consider 
the interdependency of the ITC and CSI rebate. If the CSI rebate drops, the post-rebate amount will 
increase and the ITC will increase. The post-CSI-and-ITC price will be greater than it would have been if 
we were to ignore the ITC. Similarly, if the CSI rebate drops, the MACRS benefit will increase and the 
post-incentive price will increase. 
 To account for this, we correct the CSI rebate as follows: 
 
������! = ��� ∗ 1 − ���% ∗ (1 −�����%)                                    (4.6)12 
 
where ������! is the adjusted CSI rebate, ITC% is the ITC as a percentage of reported cost (always 30% 
here), and MACRS% is the implied MACRS benefit as a percentage of total reported cost. We detail and 
justify this adjustment method and also demonstrate that a firm’s marginal corporate tax rate does not 
affect it in Appendix D.  
 
4.5 Pass-through of solar subsidies 
In this section we describe our empirical specification and main results. We also show that our 
findings are robust across numerous specifications when including controls and a rich set of fixed effects, 
and when testing the sensitivity of our results to the flexibility of time trend and discount rate 
assumptions. 
 
4.5.1 Econometric framework 
To understand how solar subsidies are passed-through to consumers, we estimate the effect of the 
adjusted CSI rebate on post-incentive price using the following linear specification that allows for 
heterogeneous effects between TPO and HO consumers: 
 
�! = � + �!������! + �!������! ∗ ��� + �!��� + X!� + �! + �! + �! + �!                         
+�! + �! + �!                                                                       (4.7)13 
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where Pi is the post-incentive price, or the NPC, of system i, Rebatei is the adjusted CSI rebate, and TPO 
is an indicator for the business model equal to one if TPO and zero otherwise. The matrix Xi includes 
control variables, �! are module manufacturer fixed effects, �!are county fixed effects, �! are IOU 
territory fixed effects, �! are module model fixed effects, �! are installer fixed effects, �! are business 
model (BM)-specific weekly quadratic time trends, and �! is a disturbance term. 
We include a rich set of fixed effects to model time-invariant mean differences in prices across 
IOUs, counties, module models, and module manufacturers. The ideal specification would further include 
installer fixed effects to account for time-invariant mean differences in prices across installers, but this 
demands too much of our data. We reduce the dimensionality by creating indicator variables for any 
installer that captures more than 1 percent of the TPO market and any installer that captures more than 1 
percent of the HO market and call these installer fixed effects. 
 The matrix of controls includes three system characteristics that could impact price: CSI rating, 
CSI rating squared, and a dummy if more than one inverter was used in the installation. The CSI rating 
reflects the electricity generation capacity of the solar PV system adjusted for installation-specific 
characteristics such as panel orientation, inverter efficiency, and the solar energy resource of the 
installation location. The electricity generation of the solar PV system proxies for consumer savings on 
electricity bills associated with installing solar. This is likely a critical determinant of solar system price 
as it reflects the value of solar to the consumer.
55
 Similarly, inverters account for a large proportion of 
total system cost. We also include six zip code level mean demographic and housing characteristics that 
could affect price because of numerous reasons, such as strategic marketing efforts by installers or 
negotiation skills by consumers. These include median household income, median house value, housing 
density, population density, median age, and percentage of the population with a bachelors degree or 
higher. 
 Lastly, our approach uses smooth BM-specific weekly quadratic time trends to control for general 
pricing trends such as declining costs and technology uncertainty while allowing these to vary across 
contract forms. Figure 4.4 illustrates how NPCs follow different trends according to whether the contract 
is in the form of a lease, PPA, prepaid lease, or purchase (HO), which motivates our inclusion of BM-






Figure 4.4: Net Present Cost by Contract Type in California, 2010-Q2 2013 
 
 
4.5.2 Main results 
Table 4.2 presents the treatment effect of a $1/kW rebate level increase for HO and TPO 
consumers. In our preferred specification including all controls and fixed effects (Column 7), pass-
through is estimated to be 88.3% for HOs and 160% for TPOs. Our results are stable across specifications 
in significance and magnitude, which consistently suggest <100% pass-through for HOs and >100% pass-
through for TPOs. The coefficient estimate on the TPO indicator capturing time-invariant factors that 
account for price differences between TPOs and HOs is not statistically significant once we our full set of 













Table 4.2:29Main Estimates: Pass-Through of Solar Subsidies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Incentive 0.342*** 0.313*** -0.221** -0.447*** -0.563*** -0.600*** -0.883*** 
 
(0.116) (0.085) (0.091) (0.079) (0.073) (0.071) (0.061) 
       
  
Incentive * 
1[system = TPO] -1.095*** -0.865*** -1.083*** -1.018*** -0.943*** -1.004*** -0.718*** 
 
(0.228) (0.212) (0.214) (0.215) (0.210) (0.213) (0.206) 
       
  
1[system = TPO] -0.607*** -0.532*** -0.492*** -0.056 -0.167 -0.163 -0.270 
 
(0.191) (0.712) (0.172) (0.167) (0.175) (0.175) (0.109) 
                
Controls 
 
x x x x x x 
Utility FE 
  
x x x x x 
Manufacturer FE 
   
x x x x 
Module FE 
    
x x x 
County FE 
     
x x 
Installer FE 
      
x 
Quadratic BM time 
trends x x x x x x x 
Number of 
Observations 34443 34300 34300 34300 34300 34300 34300 
Note: Data cover all systems installed in California for consumers who applied for the CSI rebate during the period 
2010-Q2 2013. Systems over 10 kW were omitted as well as systems with NPCs greater than $20/kW or less than 
$0.5/kW. Controls include CSI rating, CSI rating squared, a dummy if there is more than one inverter, and zip code 
level demographics. A 10% nominal discount rate is assumed for the MACRS and NPC calculations. Asterisks 
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by zip code. 
 
 
4.5.3 Robustness checks 
One critical assumption of our identification strategy is that all price trends are smooth over time 
besides the CSI rebate. To be confident that our results are not sensitive to the flexibility of time trend, we 
estimate additional specifications with increasingly flexible BM-specific weekly time trends. These 
results are provided in Table 4.3. We find that the magnitude and significance of our estimates are stable 
with increasing time trend flexibility. In the most flexible case when including BM-specific year-by-
quarter fixed effects (Column 12), pass-through is 86.1% for HOs and 158.6% for TPOs, which is very 










Table 4.3:30Sensitivity of Pass-Through Estimates to Time Trend Flexibility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             Incentive 0.107 -0.891*** 0.342*** -0.883*** 0.343*** -0.914*** 0.312*** -0.893*** 0.303** -0.929*** 0.323*** -0.861*** 
 
(0.112) (0.058) (0.116) (0.061) (0.116) (0.061) (0.117) (0.061) (0.117) (0.062) (0.115) (0.061) 
             
Incentive *  
1[system = 
TPO] 
-1.121*** -0.832*** -1.095*** -0.718*** -1.074*** -0.670*** -1.075*** -0.633*** -1.094*** -0.715*** -1.094*** -0.725*** 
 
(0.238) (0.225) (0.228) (0.206) (0.225) (0.202) (0.225) (0.203) (0.229) (0.206) (0.221) (0.199) 
             
1[system 
= TPO] 
-0.683*** -0.009 -0.607*** -0.270 -0.852*** -0.714*** -1.067*** -0.903*** -1.079*** -0.552* 1.077*** -0.180 
 
(0.157) (0.155) (0.191) (0.169) (0.209) (0.189) (0.252) (0.241) (0.329) (0.298) (0.207) (0.136) 




























































County FE x   x   x   x   x   x 
Linear 
trends x x 
 
x 
        Quadratic trends 
 
x x 
        Cubic 
trends 
    
x x 
      Quartic trends 
     
x x 
    Quintic trends 
       
x x 
  Quarter*Year*BM FEs 
         
x x 
Observations 34443 34300 34443 34300 34443 34300 34443 34300 34443 34300 34443 34300 
Note: Data cover all systems installed in California for consumers who applied for the CSI rebate during the period 2010-2013 Q2. 
Systems over 10 kW were omitted as well as systems with NPCs greater than $20/kW or less than $0.5/kW. Controls include CSI 
rating, CSI rating squared, a dummy if there is more than one inverter, and zip code level demographics. A 10% nominal discount rate 






 It is possible that our discount rate assumption for the NPC and MACRS calculations is 
inaccurate. Consumers exhibit unique discount rates, and it is also possible that average discount rates 
differ between TPO and HO consumers more generally. For instance, the choice of TPO might suggest a 
binding liquidity constraint and thus TPO consumers may exhibit higher discount rates on average than 
HOs. To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the discount rate assumption, we estimate pass-
through assuming nominal discount rates ranging from 5% to 15% and demonstrate that the CSI rebate 
effects on post-incentive price are quite stable across specifications (see Table 4.4). We also show how 
our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of BM-specific time trends that differentiate between contract 
types as opposed to just HO vs. TPO by including HO vs. TPO weekly quadratic time trends in Column 1 
of Table 4.4. The stability in magnitude and statistical significance of our estimates is reassuring and 
suggests that the estimated coefficients are representative of rebate level change impacts on post-incentive 
price.  
Table 4.4:31Robustness Checks of Pass-Through Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
 










      Incentive -0.887*** -0.886*** -0.885*** -0.882*** -0.881*** 
 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) 
      Incentive *  
1[system = TPO] -0.690*** -832*** -0.777*** -0.689*** -0.657*** 
 
(0.253) (0.308) (0.254) (0.188) (0.173) 
      1[system = TPO] -0.217 0.658** 0.222 -0.521*** -0.813*** 
 
(0.204) (0.260) (0.213) (0.152) (0.138) 
      Controls x x x x x 
Utility FE x x x x x 
Manufacturer FE x x x x x 
Module FE x x x x x 
County FE x x x x x 
Installer FE x x x x x 
Quadratic BM weekly time trends x x x x 
Number of Observations 34300 34300 34300 34300 34300 
Note: Data cover all systems installed in California for consumers who applied for the CSI rebate during the period 
2010-Q2 2013. Systems over 10 kW were omitted as well as systems with NPCs greater than $20/kW or less than 
$0.5/kW. Controls include CSI rating, CSI rating squared, a dummy if there is more than one inverter, and zip code level 




It is possible that our estimates are biased if variables that explain price vary between the HO and 
TPO markets. To strengthen our counterfactual, we use propensity score matching to compare differences 
in pass-through between similar TPO and HO systems sold in similar markets. We match on CSI rating, 
whether the system has more than one inverter, and six demographic variables measured at the zip code 
level. Matching on CSI rating allows us to compare systems with similar expected generation output as it 
captures the system size as well as other system characteristics such as design factor, inverter efficiency, 
etc. Similarly, we expect systems with more than one inverter to be more expensive than those with only a 
single inverter. Lastly, matching on zip code demographics allows us to compare TPO and HO systems 
sold in similar markets. This helps us control for any pricing discrimination that could have occurred 
according to income, education, etc., or any location-specific marketing campaigns. 
Appendix Table B4.2 in Appendix 4B presents the results from the propensity score matching 
specifications. We find that pass-through is 83.7% for HOs and 146% for TPOs when including all 
controls and fixed effects. Although the estimate for TPOs is slightly lower here than in our baseline 
specification, it is still statistically different from 100% and the estimates are stable in magnitude and 
consistency across all specifications in Appendix 4B Table B4.2. 
Furthermore, it is possible that our estimates are biased because TPOs are back-loaded in the data 
to later years when overall solar PV costs were significantly lower than they were in earlier years. To be 
confident that this is not affecting our results, we ran our regressions on sub-samples of the data for 2010 
only and 2011-Q2 2013. These estimates are presented in Appendix Table 4.3 of Appendix 4B, which are 
not quite as stable as in previous specifications. When including 2010 only, pass-through is 108% for 
HOs and 211% for TPOs. This could be indicative of strategic deterrence behavior as few firms with 
market power offered very low prices in an effort to deter market entry when the market was less 
developed. For 2011-Q2 2013, pass-through is 49.2% for HOs and 180% for TPOs. Although less stable, 
these findings suggest that pass-through for TPOs is consistently much higher than it is for TPOs and 
statistically greater than 100% despite which years we include, alleviating concerns that the high pass-
through for TPOs is caused by TPOs being back-loaded in our data. 
Lastly, we demonstrated that a “bunching” effect is present in our data. To examine whether this 
is biasing our results, we estimate pass-through based upon sub-samples that omit observations within 4 
weeks, 8 weeks, and 12 weeks of rebate level drop dates in each IOU. Table B4.4 in Appendix 4B 
presents these results. Pass-through estimates range from 90% to 104% for HOs and 169% to 207% for 
TPOs in these specifications. While this suggests that the nesting effect may have induced a bias in our 
main estimates and HO pass-through may not be statistically less than 100%, TPO pass-through is still 
consistently much higher than HO pass-through. 
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4.6 Conclusions  
In this paper we estimate the pass-through of solar subsidies to consumers allowing for 
heterogeneous effects between TPO and HO consumers. We find that pass-through rates differ 
substantially. In our preferred specification, HO customers capture roughly 88% of the subsidy while 
TPO customers receive 160%. This is surprising because standard economic theory predicts that the 
relative benefit of a subsidy does not depend on who actually receives it, and pass-through for TPOs is 
remarkably high. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate pass-through of green energy 
technology subsidies in a third party market and to demonstrate that the familiar result of invariance does 
not hold in the California residential solar PV market. 
There are a number of reasons that pass-through could differ between TPO and HO consumers. 
One potential explanation is consumer selection. Theory predicts that pass-through is higher when 
consumers are more price inelastic, all else equal. We plan to estimate demand elasticities for the HO and 
TPO markets to examine whether this can explain our findings, however demand elasticities alone cannot 
explain pass-through that exceeds unity. Indeed, the pass-through for TPOs is statistically higher than 100 
percent across all of our specifications. 
Another potential explanation for our findings is a difference in market structure between the 
TPO and HO markets. Under perfect competition, pass-through is entirely determined by elasticity of 
supply and demand. However, the residential solar PV market is an imperfectly competitive market. We 
plan to examine whether interacting a measure of competition with the CSI rebate can explain our results. 
Furthermore, under imperfect competition, curvature of demand affects incidence. A positive log-
curvature of demand could explain a greater than 100 percent pass-through rate. 
 Our findings raise two related questions that are important to economists as well as 
policymakers. First, what explains the remarkably high pass-through to TPO consumers? Second, why 
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Figure A4.1:5Total Installations per Day for a) Southern California Edison (SCE), b) San Diego Gas & Electric 
(SDGE&E), and c) Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) 
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Table B4.1:32NPC and Contract Terms Descriptive Statistics 
  Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
            
Leases 
     Upfront Payment ($) 581 $1,719.84 $2,816.78 $0.00 $18,949.90 
Term Length (years) 581 19.75 1.98 7.00 25.00 
Monthly Payment ($) 581 $131.57 $54.74 $15.28 $345.00 
Escalation Rate (%) 581 1.12% 1.63% 0.00% 5.00% 
Net Present Cost ($/Watt) 581 $3.59 $0.94 $0.98 $9.60 
CSI Rebate ($/Watt) 581 $0.40 $0.35 $0.12 $1.61 
     
 Prepaid Leases 
    
 Upfront Payment ($) 400 $15,844.79 $5,842.75 $4,491.42 $40,247.05 
Net Present Cost ($/Watt) 400 $2.91 $0.74 $1.69 $6.51 
CSI Rebate ($/Watt) 400 $0.39 $0.32 $0.13 $1.63 
     
 PPAs 
    
 Upfront Payment ($) 365 $737.82 $1,835.43 $0.00 $16,250.00 
Term Length (years) 365 19.71 0.71 18.00 20.00 
PPA Rate ($/kWh) 365 $0.21 $0.05 $0.09 $0.35 
Escalation Rate (%) 365 1.90% 1.42% 0.00% 4.00% 
Net Present Cost ($/Watt) 365 $3.84 $0.88 $1.73 $6.93 
CSI Rebate ($/Watt) 365 $0.36 $0.35 $0.11 $1.64 
 
     HOs (purchased) 
     Net Present Cost ($/Watt) 33097 $4.13 $1.38 $0.51 $17.28 
















Table	B4.2:33Propensity Score Matching Estimates Pass-Through of Solar Subsidies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Incentive -0.076 -0.091 -0.504** -0.665*** -0.668*** -0.645*** -0.837*** 
 
(0.205) (0.174) (0.202) (0.198) (0.216) (0.219) (0.197) 
        Incentive *  
1[system = TPO] -0.677** -0.493* -0.651** -0.656*** -0.866*** -0.884*** -0.626** 
 
(0.285) (0.258) (0.259) (0.249) (0.273) (0.290) (0.277) 
        1[system = TPO] -0.835*** -0.945*** -0.937*** -0.599*** -0.504** -0.485* -0.458* 
 
(0.253) (0.223) (0.222) (0.219) (0.243) (0.255) (0.247) 
                
Controls 
 
x x x x x x 
Utility FE 
  
x x x x x 
Manufacturer FE 
   
x x x x 
Module FE 
    
x x x 
County FE 
     
x x 
Installer FE 
      
x 
Quadratic BM-
specific trends x x x x x x x 
Observations  2692 2692 2692 2692 2692 2692 2692 
Note: Matching based upon six demographic zip code level control variables, CSI rating, and dummy for whether 
the system has more than one inverter. Data cover all systems installed in California which applied for the CSI 
rebate during the period 2010-Q2 2013. Systems over 10 kW were omitted as well as systems with NPCs greater 
than $20/kW or less than $0.5/kW. Controls include CSI rating, CSI rating squared, a dummy if there is more than 
one inverter, and zip code level demographics. A 10% nominal discount rate is assumed for the MACRS and NPC 















Table B4.3:34Robustness Checks on Time Sub-Samples 
  (1) (2) 
      
  2010 Only 2011-Q2 2013 
      
Incentive -1.075*** -0.492*** 
  (0.162) (0.089) 
      
Incentive * 1[system = TPO] -1.037*** -1.307*** 
  (0.274) (0.358) 
      
1[system = TPO] -0.441 0.803* 
  (0.322) (0.446) 
      
Controls x x 
Utility FE x x 
Manufacturer FE x x 
Module FE x x 
County FE x x 
Installer FE x x 
Quadratic business model-specific time trends x x 
Number of Observations 11529 22771 
Note: Data cover all systems installed in California for consumers who applied for the CSI rebate during the period 
2010-2013 Q2. Systems over 10 kW were omitted as well as systems with NPCs greater than $20/kW or less than 
$0.5/kW. Controls include CSI rating, CSI rating squared, a dummy if there is more than one inverter, and zip code 
level demographics. A 10% nominal discount rate is assumed for the MACRS and NPC calculations.. Asterisks 
denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by zip code. 
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Table	B4.4:35Omitting Observations Around Rebate Drops	
  4 Weeks 8 Weeks 12 Weeks 
        
Incentive -0.900*** -0.962*** -1.041*** 
  (0.063) (0.067) (0.075) 
        
Incentive * 1[system = TPO] -0.792*** -0.900*** -1.027*** 
  (0.225) (0.231) (0.279) 
        
1[system = TPO] -0.203 -0.105 0.057 
  (0.186) (0.199) (0.268) 
        
Controls x x x 
Utility FE x x x 
Manufacturer FE x x x 
Module FE x x x 
County FE x x x 
Installer FE x x x 
Quadratic business model-specific time trends x x x 
Number of Observations 30764 26758 21560 
Note: Data cover all systems installed in California for consumers who applied for the CSI rebate during 
the period 2010-2014. Systems over 10 kW were omitted as well as systems with NPCs greater than 
$20/kW or less than $0.5/kW. Controls include CSI rating, CSI rating squared, a dummy if there is more 
than one inverter, and zip code level demographics. A 10% nominal discount rate is assumed for the 
MACRS and NPC calculations. Asterisks denote * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors 
clustered by zip code. 
	
	
4.11 Appendix C: Additional Details on Data Preparation 
A few other steps were taken to prepare the CSI data in addition to what is described in the text. 
Observations filed under the Multifamily Affordable Solar Housing (MASH) program were dropped as 
we consider decision-making for multifamily housing to be fundamentally different than it is for 
individual households. There were some cases where the “First New Reservation Request Date” was 
listed as later than the “First Reservation Request Review Date”, which is the opposite timing of the CSI 
application process. We considered this data entry error and dropped these observations because the “First 
Reservation Request Review Date” is importantly the date at which the CSI rebate level is determined. 
There were also some observations for which the listed incentive amount exceeded the total reported cost. 
We considered this data entry error as well and dropped these observations. 
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 Lastly, we omitted systems that were greater than 10 kW since residential solar PV systems 
generally do not exceed 10 kW. Most residential solar electric systems require between 50 square feet and 
1,000 square feet, and a general rule that is often applies is that 100 square feet of solar panels will 
generate 1 kW of electricity (Hois 2013). We also dropped observations with an NPC of less than 
$0.50/kW or greater than $20/kW when assuming a 10% nominal discount rate, viewing these as outliers. 
	
4.12 Appendix D: Correction Factor for CSI to Adjust for ITC and MACRS 
This section details the motivation for adjusting the CSI rebate as shown in Equation 4.6. We 
begin by examining the case of HOs. Note that 
 
���!" = �� − ��� − ���                                                            (A4.1)14 
 
where ���!" is the NPC for an HO system, or the post-incentive price, TC is the total reported cost, CSI 
is the CSI rebate awarded, and ITC is the implied ITC benefit. For HO customers, the CSI rebate is 
considered a price reduction for tax credit purposes. Thus, the 30% tax credit applies to the after-rebate 
net price paid by the customer, so that the ITC can be found as shown in Equation 4.1. Given this, a $1 
increase in the CSI rebate is really a 70 cents increase in total subsidies because the ITC decreases by 30 
cents: 
 
���!" = �� − ��� − 0.3 ∗ (�� − ���)                                           (A4.1.1) 
 
���!" = 0.7 ∗ (�� − ���)                                                    (A4.1.2) 
 
In our regression analysis, we estimate 
 







  .                                                                (A4.1.4) 
 
However, this is not exactly pass-through. Pass-through is equal to 
!"#
!"#$
. We can re-write this as: 
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0.7 ∗ �� − ��� = ���� +  �                                                 (A4.1.5) 
 





��� + ��� + �                                                      (A4.1.7) 
 
to see that � should be scaled by 0.7. Note, however, that this is equivalent to estimating  
 
��� ~ �(0.7 ∗ ���) +  �.                                                     (A4.1.8) 
 
Dividing the estimated � from Equation A4.1.3 by 0.7 gives the same result as the estimated � from 
Equation A4.1.8. Furthermore, the standard errors scale proportionately, so there’s no need for the delta 
method. 
 
For TPOs,  
 
���!"# = �� − ��� − ��� −�����                                               (A4.1.9) 
 
We first ignore MACRS to show that the firm’s marginal corporate tax rate does not affect the correction 
of the CSI for the ITC. For TPOs, the state rebate is taxable income and therefore the basis for the 30% 
credit is not reduced by the rebate amount. However, these firms face corporate taxes and the IRS 
considers the CSI rebate to be earned income, which offsets the ITC benefit for third parties. The ITC for 
third parties, therefore, can be found as shown in Equation 4.3.  
 Ignoring MACRS, consider again   
 




���!"# = �� − ��� − 0.3 + ���� =  ���� + �                           (A4.1.11) 
 






                                                                  (A4.1.12) 
 





�� − ��� − 0.3�� + ���� =  ���� + �                                       (A4.1.13) 
 
0.7�� + � − 1 ��� =  ���� + �                                                (A4.1.14) 
 
0.7�� =  ���� − � − 1 ��� + �                                             (A4.1.15) 
 






��� + �                                                     (A4.1.16) 
 
and we find that � should be scaled by 0.7 for TPOs as well and the tax rate does not affect �. Once 
again, dividing our estimated � by 0.7 is equivalent to regressing Equation A4.1.8, and standard errors 
scale proportionately.  
 Up until this point, we have ignored MACRS for TPOs. We can find the implied MACRS value 
for each TPO based upon Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5 and then calculate the MACRS as a percentage 
of total reported cost (MACRS%). A $1 increase in the CSI is really a (1-MACRS%) increase in total 
subsidies. As such, the final adjustment for all incentives is: 
 








This dissertation examines three questions related to human society’s relationship with energy 
systems. In the first chapter, I explore how consumer-level corruption impacts electricity reliability in 
developing countries by showing that bribes for electricity connections are closely related to higher 
incidence of power outages. This research sheds light on how humans realistically interact with large 
physical systems and the potential for interventions targeting bribes for electricity connections in the 
quest towards improving electricity reliability in developing countries. The findings also provide insights 
into the governance of large socio-technical systems that exhibit common-pool resource (CPR) 
characteristics such as electricity grids, where there is a tension between rational behavior at the 
individual level and social efficiency. 
 Relatedly, electricity systems and their reliability are also vulnerable to increasing climate change 
risks with the onset of more frequent and extreme weather events. As global greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs) contribute significantly to global warming and electricity and heat production account for a large 
proportion of GHGs, effective policy, decision-making, and innovation in the power sector play a critical 
role towards curbing further climate change and alleviating its future impacts. Our energy choices are part 
of the solution as society seeks to find the right balance between meeting modern energy demands while 
also protecting the environment and public health. 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation explore one related topic: the adoption of clean energy 
technologies with a focus on the market for residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in the United 
States. In Chapter 2 I study stated information searching of residential solar PV adopters in California and 
show that consumers in the TPO and HO markets exhibit different preferences, assuming that searching 
behavior is a good proxy for consumer preferences. In Chapter 3 I estimate solar subsidy incidence and 
show that HO consumers capture less than 100 percent of every dollar while TPO consumers capture 
more than 100 percent of every dollar. This is surprising because standard economic theory predicts that 
the relative benefit of a subsidy is independent of to whom the subsidy is directed. This research is 
relevant for today’s policymakers since it studies the redistribution of revenue and demonstrates how 
solar subsidy benefits accrue in different parts of the market. Furthermore, the findings suggest that a 
higher proportion of solar subsidies are transferred to TPO consumers relative to HO consumers, counter 
to the common public perception that third party companies are using deceptive tactics to scam customers 
on the use of incentives. Future work will explore what explains the remarkably high pass-through to 
TPO consumers and why pass-through differs based upon to whom the subsidy is directed.  
